University of Colorado Law School

Colorado Law Scholarly Commons
Articles

Colorado Law Faculty Scholarship

1998

Subtracting Sexism from the Classroom: Law and Policy in the
Debate over All-Female Math and Science Classes in Public
Schools
Carolyn B. Ramsey
University of Colorado Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.law.colorado.edu/faculty-articles
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Education Law Commons, Fourteenth
Amendment Commons, Law and Gender Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United States
Commons

Citation Information
Carolyn B. Ramsey, Subtracting Sexism from the Classroom: Law and Policy in the Debate over All-Female
Math and Science Classes in Public Schools, 8 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 1 (1998), available at
https://scholar.law.colorado.edu/faculty-articles/752.

Copyright Statement

Copyright protected. Use of materials from this collection beyond the exceptions provided for in the Fair Use and
Educational Use clauses of the U.S. Copyright Law may violate federal law. Permission to publish or reproduce is
required.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Colorado Law Faculty Scholarship at Colorado Law
Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of Colorado Law
Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lauren.seney@colorado.edu.

+(,121/,1(
Citation: 8 Tex. J. Women & L. 1 1998-1999
Provided by:
William A. Wise Law Library

Content downloaded/printed from HeinOnline
Mon Jun 5 17:30:52 2017
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance
of HeinOnline's Terms and Conditions of the license
agreement available at http://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from
uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope
of your HeinOnline license, please use:
Copyright Information

Texas Journal of Women and the Law
Volume 8

Articles
SUBTRACTING SEXISM FROM THE CLASSROOM:
LAW AND POLICY IN THE DEBATE OVER ALLFEMALE MATH AND SCIENCE CLASSES IN

PUBLIC SCHOOLS

Carolyn B. Ramsey*
I.

Introduction

In his dissent in United States v. Virginia,1 Justice Scalia pronounced
single-sex public education "functionally dead."2 He warned that, despite
"the illusion that government officials in some future case will have a clear
shot at justifying some sort of single-sex public education," 3 the invalidation of Virginia's separate military training for men and women could not
be limited to its facts. Even if the majority left room to defend other single-sex programs, he predicted, "[t]he costs of litigating [their] constitutionality... and the risks of ultimately losing that litigation.., are simply
too high to be embraced by public officials." 4 In fact, when the Supreme
Court ruled against the Virginia Military Institute (VMI), school districts
had already begun to retreat from single-sex programs, indefinitely postponing plans for three all-male academies in Detroit and eliminating a
boys-only kindergarten class in Dade County, Florida.5
* B.A., University of California, Irvine (1990); A.M., Stanford University (1991);
J.D. with Distinction, Stanford Law School (1998). The author clerked for the Honorable
Paul J. Kelly, Jr., Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, in 1998-99. She is clerking for the
Honorable Marilyn Hall Patel, Chief Judge, Northern District of California, in 1999-2000.
She would like to thank Professor Mark Kelman and Professor Michael Ramsey for their
insights and encouragement.
1. United States v. Virginia, 116 S.Ct. 2264 (1996).
2. Id. at 2306 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
3. Id. at 2305 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
4. Id. at 2306 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
5. See Garrett v. Board of Educ., 775 F. Supp. 1004, 1006-08 (E.D. Mich. 1991)
(granting a preliminary injunction against three all-male public academies on the grounds
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The Court has not completely foreclosed a remedial rationale for gender classifications benefiting women. 6 However, in the wake of the VMI
decision, educators show understandable reluctance to experiment. The
campaign to improve adolescent girls' mathematics and science performance by allowing them to enroll in single-sex courses may be the latest
casualty of the treacherous legal waters surrounding gender distinctions.
Researcher David Sadker calls the handful of all-female math and science
programs in public schools nationwide 7 "a secret, underground educational
development that people are afraid to talk about because of the legal repercussions."' From Ventura, California, to Presque Isle, Maine, officials
have modified or abandoned girls-only classes in the face of potential law-

suits or threatened withdrawal of federal financial support.9 For example,
that the exclusion of girls was not substantially related to the goal of remedying the educational and cultural crisis facing black boys and that the school district provided different
benefits to boys and girls in violation of Title IX); see also Elaine Ray, All-Male Black
Schools Put on Hold in Detroit; Girls Will be Admitted After Court Challenge, BOSTON
GLOBE, Sept. 1, 1991, at A16; Hillary Stout, ACLU, NAACP, and NOW All Give Poor
Marks to Plans to Help Inner-City Black Male Students, WALL ST. J., Sept. 10, 1991, at
A22.
6. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 US 718, 728 (1982) ("It is readily
apparent that a State can evoke a compensatory purpose to justify an otherwise discriminatory classification only if members of the gender benefited by the classification actually
suffer a disadvantage related to the classification.") But cf id. at 733 (Burger, J., dissenting)
(contending that the majority's invalidation of an all-female nursing program that stereotyped nursing as a woman's job should not apply to fields in which women face
discrimination).
7. See Laurie J. Scott, Mathematics Class is Minus Boys: Blue Springs High School
Tests Whether Girls Learn Better on Their Own, KAN. CITY STAR, Sept. 13, 1997, at Cl
("[A]ccording to the American Association of University Women, there may be fewer than
two dozen all-girl math or science classes in public schools nationwide.").
8. Deb Riechmann, Single-Sex Classes Raise Bias Questions-Single-Sex Classes
Raise Test Scores, But Bias a Concern, Cmi. Sut-TIMEs, Feb. 23, 1996, at 36 (quoting
David Sadker). David and Myra Sadker are the authors of an influential study of sex discrimination in public school classrooms. See DAVID SADKER & MYRA SADKER, FAILING AT
FMiRNEss: How AMERICA'S SCHOOLS CHEAT GiRLs (1994).
9. See Riechmann, supra note 8, at 36 (noting that state and local officials ordered the
termination of a single-sex experiment at Myrtle Middle School in Irvington, New Jersey, in
1995, due to concerns that it violated state and federal laws); Maia Davis, Math Minus
Boys: Reports of Teaching Bias Prompt Classesfor Girls Only, L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 8, 1993,
at 3 (reporting that California officials directed Ventura High School in Ventura, California,
to make participation in its pilot math program voluntary and available to boys); Morning
Edition: Harlem All-Girls School Scrutinized After VMI Ruling, (National Public Radio,
Segment 14, Show 1939, Aug. 21, 1996) (discussing the decision to allow male students in
Anacapa Middle School's special math classes); Presque Isle, Maine, Teaches Girls Math
in Single-sex Classes and Their Stats Improve, but Civil Rights Activists are Balking, (NBC
Nightly News broadcast, June 24, 1995) [hereinafter Presque Isle] (reporting that Presque
Isle opened its math classes to boys when a complaint was filed with the U.S. Office of
Civil Rights).
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an experimental math course at Anacapa Middle School in Ventura now
accepts male students (though none has applied), and it bears the new title

"Math PLUS-Power Learning for Underrepresented Students." 10 This
change of heart and educational lingo arises from confusion in the law.
The debate over the legality of single-sex math and science classes in
public schools is fascinating because it illuminates tensions between three
theoretical perspectives: the integrationist or anti-differentiation position;
the advocacy of gender preferences in the name of anti-subordination; and
the feminist critique of single-sex education's mixed blessings for women." Anti-differentiation theorists contend that the state should eschew
racial or gender distinctions, whether or not such distinctions benefit a
subordinated group.' 2 In contrast, the anti-subordination argument makes
the impact of a classification on the subordinated group the litmus test of

its constitutionality: If it combats subordination, it survives; if not, it is
invalid.' 3 Finally, some feminists acknowledge that single-sex learning
fosters female solidarity and self-esteem but worry that the "ghettoization"
of schoolgirls will have stigmatic effects in the long-run.' 4 Does the Constitution require symmetrical treatment of the sexes-that is, can educational programs exclude men but not women? Does an anti-subordination

objective legitimize such asymmetry? Perhaps most fundamentally, should
the law forbid segregation itself-or just the stigmas and inequalities

sometimes associated with it?
10. See LynNell Hancock & Claudia Kalb, A Room of their Own, NEwsWEE, June 26,
1996, at 76.
11. See infra note 12 for examples of anti-differentiation arguments. For an example of
an anti-subordination argument, see infra note 13. For a feminist perspective, see, for instance, Deborah L. Rhode, Association and Assimilation, 81 N.W.U. L. REv. 106, 143
(1986) ("Separatist education, like other forms of separatist affiliation, offers the virtues and
vices of a ghetto: it provides support, solidarity, and self-esteem for subordinate groups, but
often at the price of perpetuating attitudes that perpetuate subordination.").
12. See Barbara A. Brown et al., The Equal Rights Amendment: A ConstitutionalBasis
for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871, 889 (1971) ('The basic principle of the
Equal Rights Amendment is that sex is not a permissible factor in determining the legal
rights of women, or of men."); William Van Alstyne, Rights of Passage:Race, the Supreme
Court, and the Constitution, 46 U. Cm. L. REv. 775, 809 (1979) ("[O]ne gets beyond racism by getting beyond it now: by a complete, resolute and credible commitment never to
tolerate in one's own life-or in the life or practices of one's government-the differential
treatment of other human beings by race.").
13. See, e.g., Ruth Colker, Anti-SubordinationAbove All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1003, 1015 (1986) ("[Uinder the equal protection framework proposed in this article, it would be permissible for a state actor to use facially differentiating
policies to redress subordination; it would not be permissible for a state actor to use facially
differentiating policies to perpetuate subordination.").
14. See Rhode, supra note 11, at 143.
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Part II of this article examines recent experiments with all-female
math and science classes and suggests that they do not violate the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. First, I discuss the injury
that plaintiffs of each sex might allege. I conclude that it would be difficult for male students to show injury of constitutional magnitude and that,
even if such harm could be demonstrated, the state's interest in remedying
female disadvantages in math and science would override it. Male plaintiffs would have to argue that they were deprived of a single-sex option,
that the state impermissibly took gender into account in structuring public
programs, or that the girls' program infringed the boys' constitutional right
to integrated schooling. The objective of facilitating gender parity in test
scores and enrollment in advanced math and science arguably trumps each
of these arguments. A female plaintiff might seek to invalidate the allfemale programs on the ground that they contribute to her subordination.
According to this view, single-sex math and science classes prepare girls
poorly for life in a coed world and imply that the plaintiff as an individual
(or females as a group) cannot compete academically with males. 5
The demand for integration poses the most interesting challenge to the
pilot programs because it provides an occasion to disentangle the constitutionality of gender segregation from the question of its desirability and to
explore whether integrated education is itself a constitutional right. Part II
contends that separatism chosen by a subordinated group does not cause
the harms against which the Court sought to protect in Brown v. Board of
Education.16

In addition to assessing the importance of the state's remedial objective and the closeness of the fit between the means and the end, Part II also
examines the risks inherent in remedial affirmative action programs. Despite the shortcomings of the remedial approach, I conclude that, under
current equal protection jurisprudence, the experimental math and science
courses bear a substantial relation to the important goal of improving female academic achievement.' 7 Theorists disagree over the wisdom of separating the sexes.18 However, proponents of single-sex math and science
15. See, e.g., Riechmann, supra note 8, at 36 (discussing the concerns of NOW Legal
Defense and Education Fund attorneys, who believe that "[f]emale math or science

classes ... suggest that girls learn these subjects at a slower pace or that they can't be
competitive").

16. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that segregation of black and white children in public
schools on the basis of race denies equal protection of the laws, even though physical facilities may be equal).
17. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982).
18. See, e.g., Valerie E. Lee & Helen M. Marks, Sustained Effects of the Single-Sex
Secondary School Experience on Attitudes, Behaviors, and Values in College, 82:3 J.
EDUC. PSYCHOL. 578-92 (1990) (discovering that girls who go to single-sex high schools
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classes can advance concrete evidence to support their position: A growing
body of empirical research indicates that male monopolization of class time
and the corresponding landslide in girls' self-esteem have detrimental effects on female academic achievement.' 9 Although strategies besides segregation might enhance the math and science performance of adolescent
girls, intermediate scrutiny does not mandate the least restrictive means for
achieving governmental ends.2" Thus, the courts should not declare the
pilot programs unconstitutional.
Part III of this essay explores the uncertain contours of Title IX, the
statute that poses the greatest barrier to single-sex classes. The legislative
history of Title IX reveals a concern that single-sex education has perpetuated women's exclusion from lucrative, technical jobs,2 1 and the text of the
statute forbids coeducational schools from offering gender-segregated
classes, except in specified circumstances.2 2 But that is not the end of the
have a higher orientation toward "challenge and prestige in the workplace," fewer stereotypical views about gender roles, and are more interested in politics than their counterparts
from coed schools); Kenneth J. Rowe, Single-sex and Mixed-sex Classes: The Effects of
Class Type on Student Achievement, Confidence, and Participationin Mathematics, 32:2

Ausm. J. EDUC. 180-202 (1988) (noting increased confidence on the part of students in
students in single-sex math classes in a study conducted at Ballarat High School in Victoria,
Australia). But see Patricia B. Campbell & Ellen Wahl, What's Sex Got to Do With It?
Simplistic Questions, Complex Answers, in SEPARATED BY SEx: A CIncTAL LOOK AT SiNGLE-SEx EDUCATION FOR GIRLS 63, 65 (American Association of University Women Edu-

cational Foundation eds., 1998) (contending that "there is no clear evidence to support the
claim that single-sex classes are better for girls"); Alice McKee, Letter to the Editor, WALL
ST. J., Nov. 3, 1992, at A17 (clarifying that the American Association of University Women, of which she is president, did not endorse single-sex education in its study, How
SCHOOLS SHORTCHANGE Gnus). See also Hancock & Kalb, supra note 10, at 76 (noting
that David Sadker, co-author of the influential study FAmLING AT FArRNESs, disapproves of
gender segregation as a long-term strategy).
19. See generally Elizabeth Fennema & Penelope Patterson, Autonomous LearningBehavior: A Possible Explanation of Gender-relatedDifferences in Mathematics, in GENDER
INFLUENCES IN CLASSROOM INTERACrION 17 (Louise Cherry Wilkinson & Cora B. Marrett
eds., 1985); Elizabeth Fennema, Success in Mathematics, in SEX DIFFERENTIATION AND
SCHOOLING

163 (Michael Marland, ed. 1983); Linda Wilson Morse & Herbert M. Handley,

Listening to Adolescents: Gender Differences in Science ClassroomInteraction,in GENDER
INFLUENCES IN CLASSROOM INTERACTION 37 (Louise Cherry Wilkinson & Cora B. Marrett
eds. 1985); Rowe, supra note 18; Elizabeth K. Stage et al., Increasing the Participationand
Achievement of Girls and Women in Mathematics, Science, and Engineering,in HANDBOOK

(Susan S. Klein ed., 1985).
20. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 116 S.Ct. 2264, 2295 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (per curiam)).
21. See infra note 231 and accompanying text.
22. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.31(b)(2) (1998) (barring the provision of "different aid, benefits, or services in a different manner" on the basis of sex); 34 C.F.R. § 106.34 ("A recipient
shall not provide any course or otherwise carry out any of its education program or activity
separately on the basis of sex, or require or refuse participation therein by any of its students
FOR ACHmVING SEx EQurrY THROUGH EDUCATION 237
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story. For a variety of reasons, devoid of theoretical coherence, Congress
declined to outlaw existing single-sex elementary and secondary schools

without further exploration of their "special qualities" and indicated its
willingness to consider new research on gender segregation.2 3 Moreover,
despite the legislators' suspicion of quotas, the implementing regulations

for Title IX include limited provisions for remedial and affirmative action
programs.' Although constituency politics arguably played the greatest
role in the final wording of the statute, there is reason to believe that, given
the data we now possess,2 5 Congress would have allowed optional singlesex classes that redress girls' disadvantages in math and science. A contrary conclusion frustrates Title IX's purpose of fostering female advancement in male-dominated fields.26

Because voluntary enrollment in single-sex math and science classes
does .not offend the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress should clarify Title
IX to allow it. However, providing greater consistency in the law may
open the door to bad policy. Part IV offers a critique of the pilot programs
based on current educational and social theories. The literature on math
teaching suggests that adolescent girls need a different pedagogical style

than that currently used in coeducational classrooms.27 Giving girls a
room of their own will not raise their test scores or their aspirations if
educators retain outmoded attitudes and instructional techniques; indeed,

such insularity may actually reinforce male chauvinism by casting girls in
the role of "special needs" students. It makes more sense to change the
way teachers conduct coed classes than to create single-sex enclaves that
do not necessarily eradicate bias.
on such basis.. ."); §§ 106.34 (c),(e),() (making exceptions for contact sports like wresfling, boxing, and football; sex education classes; and vocal choruses grouped according to
vocal range "which may result in a chorus or choruses [ofl predominantly one sex").
23. See 118 CONG. REc. 5804 (Feb. 28, 1972) (speech by Senator Bayh). Senator Bayh
admitted, at the time of the Senate vote in 1972, that "[n]o one even knows how many
single-sex schools exist on the elementary and secondary levels or what special qualities of
the schools might argue for a continued single-sex status." Id. He stated that Congress
needed more statistics and other information before it could make a "fully informed decision" about the advisability of barring single-sex admissions in grades K through 12. See id.
at 5807.
24. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.3(a)-(b) (1998); see also infra notes 247-53 and accompanying
text.
25. See infra notes 31-54 and accompanying text
26. See 118 CONG. REc. at 5813 (entering into the record a letter from the National
Federation of Business and Professional Women's Clubs, Inc. of the United States of
America, which noted that women are "often discouraged from pursuing studies in science,
mathematics, business administration-areas in which they could expect better positions
and higher pay in our technological society.").
27. See infra notes 33-37 and accompanying text.
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Like voluntary racial resegregation, girls-only math classes should not
run afoul of the law as long as they are optional and substantially equal2 8 to
those offered to boys. Educators can learn valuable lessons about the pedagogical needs of both sexes through short-term exploration of single-sex
public education .2 9 However, because female-only classes may be detrimental to both sexes in the long run,3 ° officials should be wary of making
them a permanent fixture in public schools.
II.

The Constitutionality of All-female Classes in Public Schools Under
the Equal Protection Clause

A.

Exploring All-female Learning in Math and Science

Recent experiments with all-female math and science drew inspiration
31
from a 1992 report by the American Association of University Women,
which found that adolescent girls suffer a dramatic decline in self-esteem
when they enter middle school and that this erosion of confidence stems
from the disproportionate attention teachers lavish on boys.3 2 The AAUW
report, entitled How Schools Shortchange Girls, indicates that the quality
of interaction between faculty and female students reaches its nadir in science classes, where teachers ask boys eighty percent more academicallyrelated questions.33 In another study, researchers observing a junior high
in Mississippi noted that eighth-grade boys received eighty-six percent of
the criticism and discipline in science classes and that they monopolized
the discussion by yelling out questions and answers. 34 The fact that teachers allow boys to run rampant in coed classrooms does not bestow an unambiguous benefit on the boys; yet, it does appear to have a detrimental
effect on girls.
The pattern of ignoring female students begins very early. The 1992
AAUW report suggests that, during preschool and primary grades, boys'
relatively retarded verbal skills and low impulse control demand the lion's
28. See United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2284 (1996) (concluding that the
state had failed to show substantial equality between the adversative model of training at
VMI and the program offered by Virginia Women's Institute for Leadership).
29. See infra note 267 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 268-69 and accompanying text.
31. See AmvEwCAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY WOMEN, AAUW REPORT, How
SCHOOLS SHORTCHANGE GnLs: A STUDY OF MAJOR FINDINGs ON Gnus IN EDUCATION
(1992) [hereinafter How SCHOOLS SHORTCHANGE GnUS]. Educators credit this report with
inspiring the implementation of girls' math classes in Ventura, California, and elsewhere in
the country. See Davis, supra note 9, at 3.
32. See How SCHOOLS SHORTCHANGE Gnus, supra note 31, at 13, 71.
33. See id. at 71.
34. See Morse & Handley, supra note 19, at 49.
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share of their teachers' energy.3" Another phenomenon, which is not
clearly related to the first one, involves the disparate treatment of male and
female students with regard to intellectual independence. Elementary
school boys are encouraged to engage in more exploratory and large-motor
activities than girls.36 According to Elizabeth Fennema and Penelope Patterson, the tendency of teachers to encourage independent thought in boys,
but not in girls, leaves females radically unprepared to do higher math,
where rote memorization rarely suffices. 37
Moreover, from a young age, male students behave in ways that intimidate and demean females. David and Myra Sadker, the authors of Failing at Fairness,present disturbing anecdotal evidence of sexual harassment
in the school yard, including the belittling of smart girls, who are often
accused of wearing short skirts to earn their As.38 The 1993 AAUW study
Hostile Hallways estimates that eighty-one percent of adolescent females
have been sexually harassed at school and that thirty-three percent of them
felt so disturbed by the experience that they no longer wanted to talk in
class.3 9 Girls who do not perceive the sexualization of the classroom as
harassment may still suffer in profound ways from peer pressure to be
pretty rather than smart. Educators, especially those at the classroom level,
cite the havoc wreaked by hormones as a compelling reason to keep girls
and boys apart during their adolescent years.40
Three patterns can be distilled from recent research in the United
States, England, and Australia on the underrepresentation of females in
math- and science-related professions. First, although women have made
inroads into traditionally male fields like law, they lag far behind in those
requiring higher math. Men receive ninety-one percent of all engineering
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

See How SCHOOLS SHORTCHANGE GIRLS, supra note 31, at 18-21.
See Fennema & Patterson, supra note 19, at 21-22, 27, 30.
See id. at 27.
See SADER & SADrER, supra note 8, at 108.
See id. at 111-12 (citing AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY WOMEN, HOSTILE
HALLWAYS: THE AAUW SURVEY ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN AMERICA'S SCHOOLS
(1993)).
40. See, e.g., Middle School to Separate Kids by Gender, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Mar.
30, 1997, at B3 (In one principal's opinion, single-sex classes are advisable because, "when
the boys discover the girls don't have cooties," they become "more interested in one another
than they are in school"); Davis, supra note 9, at 3 (reporting that, according to another
principal, adolescents become obsessed with their hair, clothes, and acne but that, in singlesex classes, "they're more focused on the math"). Of course, the conviction that single-sex
education will solve problems created by raging hormones overlooks the sexual tensions
affecting homosexual and bisexual youths. Indeed, the literature favoring single-sex classes
is notable for its ignorance of issues of sexual orientation. See Campbell & Wahl, supra
note 18, at 67 (criticizing proponents of single-sex education for making assumptions that
deny the existence of bisexual and homosexual adolescents).
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doctorates and occupy ninety-eight percent of faculty positions in engineering schools.4 1 At a growth rate of one percent per year, the numbers of
men and women in engineering jobs will not reach parity until the year
2020.42
Second, researchers attribute these depressing statistics to sex discrimination in grades K through 12. Sex differences in math and science
achievement seem to derive from socialization, rather than from inherent
disparities in intelligence or spatial skills.4 Deficient math training and

career counseling in secondary schools function as a "critical filter," inhibiting women's entry into science and engineering at the university level.'

Fennema writes that "[w]hen young girls feel mathematics is inappropriate
for females, they will feel anxious about succeeding in it, as they must, at
least partially, deny their femininity in order to achieve in mathematics."'4 5
Finally, gender disparities in math and science performance increase
during the secondary school years. By the twelfth grade, boys show advantages in physics, chemistry, earth and space science, and every math subject except algebra.46 Girls' standardized test scores do not keep pace with

their grade-point averages, nor do high marks in lower-level courses translate into enrollment in calculus or advanced placement physics. Indeed,

girls may drop out of college-preparatory or pre-professional math and science tracks before they cease to understand the subject matter because they
lack female role models and encouragement from parents and teachers.47
Ironically, the AAUW does not recommend single-sex education.4 8
But other researchers cautiously embrace separate instruction of boys and
SADKER & SADKER, FAILING AT FAIRNSs, supra note 8, at 166-67.
42. See Stage et al., supra note 19, at 237.
43. See Fennema, supra note 19, at 170-74 (discussing the effects of beliefs, feelings,
and attitudes on mathematical achievement).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 172.
46. See How SCHOOLS SHORTCHANGE GIns, supra note 31, at 25-26.

41. See

47. See Fennema, supra note 19, at 165 (linking females' decision "not to study mathematics beyond minimal requirements" to "non-participation in mathematics-related occupations" and speculating about the reasons for low levels of female enrollment in higher
math); Fennema & Patterson, supra note 19, at 19-20 (citing studies that note higher levels
of enrollment in advanced math courses and higher achievement on the SAT math section
among males); How SCHOOLS SHORTCHANGE Gnus, supranote 31, at 22-25 (reporting that,
despite the narrowing gap between the sexes in math achievement, girls still score lower on
the SAT and perform below boys in almost all math subjects by the end of high school);
Stage et al., supra note 19, at 240-46 (discussing societal factors that may play a more
significant role in inhibiting girls from taking advanced math classes than differing spatial
skills).
48. See Campbell & Wahl, supra note 18, at 65; McKee, supra note 17, at A17; see
also Jane Gross, Classes Girls Can Count On: Single Sex High School Classes Reduce
Math Anxiety for Students, DALLAS MoRNING NEws, Dec. 15, 1993, at 5C (reporting that
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girls in subjects where the girls experience difficulty 49 and present evidence that gender segregation in math and science has had modest success
in redressing gender imbalances.5 0 In comparative studies of single- and
mixed-sex high school math classes, single-sex groups showed the greatest
gains in confidence, test performance, and intent to enroll in advanced
math electives." Kenneth Rowe, the author of an Australian study, surmises that the elimination of cross-gender harassment and teasing facilitates these improvements.5 2 Although Rowe has not found a direct
correlation between gains in confidence and math achievement,5" his findings seem to substantiate Michael Marland's view that the introduction of
single-sex classes "would be justified if [in an otherwise mixed school]
...it was clear that one sex as a group was turning off a subject."54
Guided by their own practical experience and a somewhat overzealous
reading of the academic literature, 5 American school officials launched

single-sex math and science at public facilities in the late 1980s.56 At the
time, only two all-female public high schools remained in the nation: the

venerable Philadelphia High School for Girls, which opened its doors in
1848, and Western Senior High School in Baltimore, which also dates from
the nineteenth century. Neither school has faced a legal challenge, administrators hypothesize, because boys are uninterested in breaking down the
Susan Bailey, one of the AAUW Report authors, believes that all-female classes are "sending a message that girls are so special, so in need of extra help, that they must be taught

separately").
49. See, e.g., Rowe, supra note 18, at 195-96; Michael Marland, Should the Sexes be
Separated?, in SEx DIFERENTIATON AND SCHOOLING 183-84 (Michael Marland ed., 1983).
50. See, e.g., Rowe, supra note 18, at 195-96 (presenting findings about the success of
single-sex math classes at Ballarat High School in Victoria, Australia).
51. See id.
52. See id. at 196-97.
53. See id. at 195-96; see also Pamela Haag, Single-Sex Education in Grades K-12:
What Does the Research Tell Us?, in SEPARATED BY SEx: A CRITICAL LOOK AT SINGLE-SEX
EDUCATION FOR Gnus 13, 24 (American Association of University Women Educational
Foundation eds., 1998) (stating that Rowe "reported no significant differences in math
achievement per se" and was unable to directly relate improvements in confidence to higher
test scores).
54. Marland, supra note 49, at 184; see also Lee & Marks, supra note 18, at 589 (encouraging further research into the benefits of single-gender classes taught by same-sex
teachers in American public schools).
55. See Davis, supranote 9, at 3 (stating that all-girl classes in Ventura, California, and
elsewhere gained impetus from the AAUW Report, but even without reading such studies,
teachers had independently observed that the girls "are often subtly steered away from advanced mathematics").
56. The pilot program at Presque Isle High School in Maine began in 1988, for example. See Presque Isle, supra note 9.
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doors to an all-female bastion. 7 In contrast, several of the pilot science
and math programs have generated complaints to the United States Office
of Civil Rights.58
Experimental classes in coed schools can be sorted into four types:
1) both boys and girls have a choice between coeducational and single-sex
59
formats;
2) boys enroll in coeducational classes, while girls have a choice between
60
coeducational and single-sex formats that use the same teaching methods;
3) boys enroll in coeducational classes, while girls can elect to take an all-

female course that employs novel teaching methods; 6 '

4) girls enroll in a class that is nominally open to boys but which is designated for students who are "underrepresented" and which, in fact, contains
only female students.62
Objections have clustered around the second and third categories; the
fourth category represents a facially neutral compromise adopted by two
California schools after a complainant approached the Office of Civil
Rights. Ventura High School and Anacapa Middle School in Ventura, California, both changed their girls' math programs when state officials
warned that they must be optional and "technically open to boys."6 3 Prior
to the legal challenge, Ventura High School offered two second-year algebra classes in which female students learned without a textbook-grasping
the laws of probability, for instance, by counting the number of times a
57. See Dennis Kelly, All GirlsSchool Pushed in Detroit,USA TODAY, Aug. 8, 1991, at
1D (describing the two all-female public high schools in Baltimore and Philadelphia). In
1996, 50 seventh-graders enrolled in a new all-female public school in East Harlem. Before
it even opened its doors, the Young Women's Leadership School faced legal challenges
from civil rights groups, claiming it ran afoul of the VMI decision. The school decided to
change its admissions policies to include boys, but so far no male students have applied. See
Morning Edition: Harlem All-girls School Scrutinized (N.P.R. broadcast), supra note 9.
58. See generally Maia Davis, Inquiry Focuses on All-Female Math Classes, L.A.
TmiMS, Jan. 6, 1995, at B3.
59. Davis Elementary School in Cobb County, Georgia, started four single-sex math
classes for third- and fourth-graders. Both boys and girls had the option of choosing between coed or single-sex formats, and Principal Sandy Davis said she hoped to compare test
results. See Seth Coleman, The Gender Equation: Two Cobb Schools Get Good Results
from Separate Math Classesfor Girls and Boys, ATLArA CONST., Apr. 23, 1995, at Dl.
60. See Scott, supra note 7, at Cl (citing a two-year pilot project at Blue Springs High
School in Kansas that offers an optional all-female trigonometry class that involves the
same pedagogical techniques as coed courses). "School officials did not actively recruit
girls for the class; they simply asked those who got seventh-hour trigonometry whether they
would mind being in an all-girls class. None did." Id.
61. See infra notes 64-69 and accompanying text.
62. See infra note 63 and accompanying text.
63. See Morning Edition: HarlemAll-girls School Scrutinized (N.P.R. broadcast), supra
note 9.
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tossed coin landed heads-upf a Instructor Christine Mikles divided the
class into teams that worked with computers or completed cooperative
projects.6 5 The classroom culture emphasized collaboration and adopted a
slower pace than its coed counterpart.6 6 Anacapa Middle School also
boasted a special curriculum in which girls received career mentoring and
advice about sexual abstinence and drug abuse,67 in addition to learning
math at a leisurely rate that the students described as a "relief."'6 8 According to one news report, Anacapa's "all-girl classes grind to a halt if someone does not understand triangulation or matrix logic."69 Now dubbed
Math-PLUS and officially coeducational, the courses continue to cater to
female students.
The statistics compiled by several of these innovative schools testify
to the short-term success of the single-sex format. For example, in Presque
Isle, Maine, all-girl math courses reduced the gender disparity in test scores
from seventy-two to sixteen points,7 ° and a University of Maine professor
"found that girls who take the [single-sex] algebra course are twice as
likely to enroll in advanced chemistry and college physics than their coed
counterparts. 7 1
None of the experimental programs arises from animus. Even in cases
where girls receive different math instruction in the all-female environment
than they would in a coed course, school officials espouse an explicitly
remedial goal.7 2 One teacher at Ventura High says that parents, educators,
and peers exercise a corrosive influence on girls' resolve to continue in
math when the concepts become more difficult.73 Her all-female class,
though perhaps slower-paced than its coed counterpart, encourages female
students to work harder and to pursue advanced studies in the future.7 4
Even if the all-female programs strip math of qualities like overt competitiveness and speed, they have few empty desks. Girls praise the new for64. See Davis, supra note 9, at 3.
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. See Interview with teacher Pam Belitski, student Chris Young, and Leslie Wolfe
from the Center on Women's Policy Studies on All-girl Classes (NBC '"Today Show"
broadcast, Feb. 27, 1996).
68. See Gross, supra note 48, at 5C.
69. Id.
70. See Presque Isle, supra note 9.
71. Hancock & Kalb, supra note 10, at 76.
72. See Davis, supra note 9, at 3 (discussing the opinions of Ventura High School
teacher Christine Mikles).
73. See id.
74. See id. (noting that girls tend to feel more comfortable and receive more assistance
in a single sex classroom).
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mat, saying that they no longer worry about speaking in class or having
boys make them feel either stupid or too smart.7 5
B.

The Equal Protection Clause: Segregation, Compensation, and the
Dangers of Role-typing

Despite Justice Scalia's fear that the principles articulated in the VMI
decision make single-sex public education unconstitutional,76 the Court's
equal protection jurisprudence has not swept away gender distinctions
grounded in a legitimate compensatory purpose. The significant disparities
between Virginia's male military academy and its less rigorous sister
school formed the crux of the majority's objections in the VMI case.7 7

Predictably, Virginia could not offer a remedial rationale for a school that
had taught the supposedly masculine values of the "citizen-soldier" in an
all-male setting for more than a century.7 8
In Mississippi Universityfor Women v. Hogan,79 there were no parallel single-sex institutions, so the "separate but equal" issue did not arise.80
However, the perpetuation of nursing as a stereotypically female job troubled the majority of the Court, leading it to declare that the state could
advance a legitimate affirmative action goal only if "members of the gender benefited by the classification actually suffer a disadvantage related to
75. See, e.g., Ron Russell & John Wilson, 32 Girls Plus Science Equals Success, DETRorr Naws, July 18, 1995 (quoting 15-year-old Meredith Grow of Rochester High School
in Detroit, Michigan). The youngster said of her all-female ninth-grade science class: "I
didn't worry about what the guys were thinking this year. I didn't have the hang-up I used
to about seeming too smart if I answered every question. I kind of lost that this year. I
answered all the questions I thought I had the answers to." Id.
76. See United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2305 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(warning that the cost of litigation combined with the increased scrutiny applied in the VMI
case will dissuade public schools from providing any form of single-sex education in the
future). Id. at 2306. But see infra note 154 and accompanying text.
77. See id. at 2286.
78. Instead, the state claimed that the all-male institute served the goal of diversifying
educational opportunities in Virginia. See id. at 2276. The majority rejected this argument
on the grounds that, at the time of the school's founding, "[h]igher education ... was
considered dangerous for women." Id. at 2277. Hence, "[a] purpose genuinely to advance
an array of educational options ... is not served by VMI's historic and constant plan-a
plan to affor[d] a unique educational benefit only to males." Id. at 2279 (quoting the Court
of Appeals in United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d 890, 899 (1992)). By contrast, educators
expressed the desire to bring new options to predominantly coeducational schools as an ex
ante justification for single-sex math and science classes.
79. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
80. See id. at 720 n.1 ("Mississippi maintains no other single-sex public university or
college. Thus, we are not faced with the question of whether States can provide 'separate
but equal' undergraduate institutions for males and females.").
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the classification.""1 In neither case did the Court hold that an all-female
educational program designed to enhance women's achievement in a field
traditionally reserved for men violates equal protection.
1. Potential Challengers to All-female Math and Science Classes
In assessing the impact of Hogan and Virginia on the constitutionality
of single-sex math and science classes, we must first consider who might
claim injury. Although the Hogan majority did not discuss standing, the
dissent believed that the appellee lacked a valid constitutional claim. 2
Justice Powell dissented in Hogan because he did not consider the exclusion of men from a women's nursing school in a state that offered coeducational alternatives to be sex discrimination of constitutional magnitude.8 3
The state of Mississippi did not deny Joe Hogan instruction in nursing; it
only denied him instruction at the most convenient location; and, as Justice
Powell wryly observed, "[T]here is, of course, no constitutional right to
attend a state-supported university in one's home town."8 4
Despite Justice Powell's objections, the majority invalidated the
MUW admissions policy because it lent "credibility to the view that women, not men, should become nurses."8 5 Hogan's lack of a genuine constitutional complaint put the court in the uncomfortable position of inventing
one for him. As Justice Powell commented, "Having found 'discrimination,' the Court [found] it difficult to identify the victims." 86 None of the
two thousand women enrolled at MUW filed suit, nor did any female applicant complain about having to choose between a single-sex school in Columbus, Mississippi, and a coeducational program elsewhere in the state."
The Court invalidated the school's admissions policy as the result of one
man's lawsuit.8 8 Yet, somewhat ironically, the majority seemed to see
stereotypical ideas about women as the chief wrong to be prevented. 89
81.

Id. at 728.

82. See id. at 745 (Powell, J., dissenting).
83. See id. at 744 (Powell, J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 736 (Powell, J., dissenting).
85. See id. at 730.

86. Id. at 745 (Powell, J., dissenting).
87. See id. at 741 (Powell, J., dissenting). In fact, female students and alumnae of MUW
filed amicus briefs urging the court to allow the state "to continue offering the choice from
which they have benefited." Id. at 736.
88. See id. at 741 (Powell, J., dissenting) (characterizing the suit as "a case in which no
woman has complained, and the only complainant is a man who advances no claims on
behalf of anyone else"). Id.
89. The Hogan Court stated that gender classifications "must be applied free of fixed
notions concerning the roles and abilities of males and females." Id. at 724-25 (emphasis
added). However, O'Connor's majority opinion was based on concern that labeling nursing
as a woman's profession harmed females. For example, the Court noted, "Officials of the
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Plaintiffs challenging all-female math and science classes in public
schools could be male or female. But, in order to have standing, they must
allege a "particularized, actual, or imminent invasion of a legally protected
interest" redressable by the court.9" As in Hogan, there is some question
about whom, if anyone, the single-sex pilot programs injure.
a. Male Plaintiffs
In either their official or unofficial forms, the special math and science
classes primarily seek to help female students; thus, they involve a number
of potential harms to boys. First, a male plaintiff might complain that the
formal creation of single-sex classes for girls, but not for boys, gives females a benefit that boys do not receive. Such an argument raises questions
of fact, as well as law, for the courts would have to determine, on the basis
of educational data, whether all-male classes would aid boys. Even if male
students do not perform better in math and science in a single-sex environment, they might benefit from all-male instruction in other subjects. A
recent public school experiment suggests that the advantages of gender
segregation accrue to boys, as well as to girls. At Marsteller Middle
School in Manassas, Virginia, which has single-sex classes for boys and
girls in language arts and physics, male students raised their language arts
scores a whole grade in one term.91 It is not clear whether this improvement occurred because the all-male environment alleviated boys' fears
about the effeminacy of poetry-reading, because males generally study
better in the absence of females, or simply because the excitement of a new
program pushed the students to study harder.
Whatever the reasons for the boys' gains in language arts, however,
the Marsteller evidence demands that public schools which explore only
the virtues of all-female classes justify their asymmetrical allocation of
benefits. Several girls' math courses, including the ones offered in California schools, involved novel pedagogy: They were taught without textbooks, and they placed more emphasis on teamwork, computer skills, and
social issues than the coed classes did.92 The different, though not necessarily superior, characteristics of such programs focus the debate acutely
American Nurses Association have suggested that excluding men from the field has depressed nurses' wages." Id. at 730 n.15.
90. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
91. See Hancock & Kalb, supra note 10, at 76.
92. See Davis, supra note 9, at 3 (discussing teaching techniques in Christine Mildes'
all-girls class at Ventura High School); Presque Isle, supra note 9 (reporting that all-girls
math classes at Anacapa Middle School discuss sexual abstinence and the dangers posed by
drugs and alcohol).
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on the constitutionality of compensatory preferences and the substantial
equality of instruction offered to each sex.
The second cluster of arguments that a male student might raise as-

signs value to integration, rather than to single-sex learning. Thus, it taps
into the wider controversy about the imperative of race- and gender-blindness in American society. According to advocates of gender-blindness, the
state must guarantee equal treatment under neutral norms and structure educational offerings without regard to gender.93 Unlike the allocation of
seats in a medical school or contracts to build a guardrail, the creation of
all-female classes at a coed facility does not deprive boys of a finite resource that they otherwise would have enjoyed.9 4 However, public funding for all-female classes still may abridge the right of a male student not
to attend a public school that takes gender into account. A boy could demand either that the state establish integrated institutions unless gender
segregation arises randomly, or that the state prevent gender imbalances
even in a random allocation scheme.
The decision to open the pilot programs to boys removes the denialof-access problem. However, providing thinly-disguised courses for female students may alter the gender ratio in math and science classrooms in
a way that creates de facto segregation. 95 Two harms arguably flow from
gender separation, whether it is official or not: the stigmas inherent in stereotyping and the educational impoverishment of both sexes due to a lack of
interaction between boys and girls.
93. See Brown et al., supra note 12, at 889 ("[T]he treatment of any person by the law
may not be based on the circumstance that such person is of one sex or the other .... In
short, sex is a prohibited classification."). The authors of this article on the underlying
theory of the Equal Rights Amendment made exceptions for remedial decrees "where damage has been done by a violator who acts on the basis of a forbidden characteristic." Id. at
904. They admitted that public bathrooms need not be unisex. See id. at 900-02. But the
basic message of their manifesto was that "[e]quality of rights means that sex is not a
factor." Id. at 892.
94. See Kevin Brown, Do African-Americans Need Immersion Schools?: the Paradoxes
Created by Legal Conceptualizationof Race and Public Education, 78 IowA L. REv. 813,

870 (1993) (making a similar argument with regard to the impact of black immersion
schools on whites).
95. School administrators may see their wish for all-female math classes fulfilled, despite the nominal opening of enrollment to boys. Indeed, it is unclear that any students,
besides females and perhaps ethnic minorities, would feel welcome in a class labeled "for
underrepresented students." See Davis, supra note 9, at 3 (discussing Anacapa Middle
School's new, gender-neutral program and the dearth of male enrollment). The percentage
of girls who must abandon their old classes to effectively destroy coeducational instruction
represents a thorny factual question. Yet, the most problematic aspect of a challenge to de
facto gender separation lies in the Court's unwillingness to ascribe discriminatory purposes
to facially neutral programs that disadvantage one sex. See infra notes 114-18 and accompanying text.
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A male plaintiff might argue that the exclusion of boys from certain
classes reinforces negative images of adolescent males-branding them as
disruptive, aggressive, and out-of-control. The most compelling aspect of
this complaint lies in its insight that stereotypes cannot cure stereotypes
and that female-only math classes premised on negative perceptions of
masculinity foster reverse sexism. In the late 1970s, William Van Alstyne
argued that "[w]e shall not see racism disappear by employing its own
ways of classifying people and of measuring their lights."9 6 A male plaintiff might raise similar objections to sex-based distinctions in public
schools. As a threshold matter, however, he must show that the harm he
suffers is sufficiently particularized and imminent to confer standing.97
The current Supreme Court probably would find stigmatic injury too
attenuated to confer standing on a male plaintiff. A boy who does not
desire admittance into an all-female class at his school advances a claim
that is as generalized as that raised by any boy in the state, or even the
whole nation, who resents the stigmatic implications of all-female educa-

tion. 98 Although the Court considers non-economic injury sufficient for
standing if the plaintiff has personally suffered discriminatory treatment, a
majority of the Justices are unlikely to give standing to a male student who
has not sought entry into a female-only math course.9 9
The de facto impairment of coeducation more clearly constitutes a
particularized harm. Like racial integration, coeducation at least theoretically combats prejudice by bringing boys and girls into contact with each
other.'" 0 In Allen v. Wright, in which the parents of black children chal96. See Van Alstyne, supra note 12, at 809.
97. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 555 (1992).
98. Cf Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 756 (1984) (discussing why parents of black
children lacked standing to challenge the Internal Revenue Service's grant of tax exempt
status to racially-discriminatory private schools). In Allen, the parents complained about
stigmatic injury arising from the existence of racist schools and the government's indirect
support of them through tax exemptions. They did not allege that the schools had denied
their children admission. See id. at 755-57 & n.22. While asserting that stigmatic injuries
might support standing under certain circumstances, the majority concluded that, if the Allen plaintiffs were given standing, "[a] black person in Hawaii could challenge the grant of
a tax exemption to a racially discriminatory school in Maine." Id. at 755-56. The crux of
the majority's objections thus lay in the fact the plaintiffs had not been personally subjected
to the private schools' discriminatory policies. See id. at 756 n.22.
99. See id.; see also Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 168 (1972) (stating
that plaintiff lacked standing to challenge the lodge's discriminatory membership policies
because he had never sought to become a member).
100. For an insightful discussion of the integrationist position with regard to race, see
Gary Pellet, Race Consciousness, 1990 DuK L. J.758, 766-82. Peller writes:
[The] deep link between racism and ignorance on the one hand, and integration
and knowledge on the other, helps explain the initial focus of the integrationists
on public education: Children who attended integrated schools would learn the
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lenged the Internal Revenue Service's tax exemption for racially-discriminatory schools, even though their children had not sought admission to

these institutions, the majority noted that "the diminished ability to receive
an education in a racially-integrated school... is beyond any doubt, not
only judicially cognizable but.., one of the most serious injuries recognized in our legal system."'' However, according to the Court, the plaintiffs in Allen lacked standing because this alleged harm was neither fairly
traceable to the government's conduct nor redressable through judiciallymandated means."0 2 A male challenger to all-female math and science
classes has a better shot at standing than the Allen plaintiffs. The state
created the disputed math classes, and the state can be compelled to dismantle them; thus, both the traceability and redressability elements are satisfied. I will argue below that a constitutional right to integration is much
more ambiguous in the race and gender contexts than the Allen Court assumed.'0" Yet, a boy deprived of a coeducational experience suffers an
injury sufficient to open the doors to the courthouse, whether or not he can
succeed on the merits.
Finally, separating the sexes for math and science instruction may per-

petuate undesirable notions about women's roles and intelligence. Such an
allegation would merit serious consideration if it were brought by a female,

but it is a weak complaint for a male challenger to raise. As Justice Ste1 4
vens argued in his dissenting opinion in Adarand Constructorsv. Pena, 0

truth about each others' unique individuality before they came to believe stereotypes rooted in ignorance.
Id. at 770. Many of the educators who oppose all-female math and science classes espouse
similar beliefs about coeducation. For example, Ruby Takanishi, executive director of the
Carnegie Council on Adolescent Development, contends that "[the development of girls
does not occur without contact or interaction with boys ....It seems obvious that organizations seeking to advance the prospects of girls ought to link up with organizations that are
working with boys." Laura Sessions Stepp, How Girls Learn Best, WASH. PosT, May 28,
1996, at B5.
101. Allen, 468 U.S. at 756. Although the majority denied black parents standing in
Allen, the Court noted that the impairment of a plaintiff's opportunity to learn in an integrated setting is a "concrete, personal interest that can support standing in some circumstances." Id.
102. According to the Allen Court:
The diminished ability of [plaintiffs'] children to receive a desegregated education
would be fairly traceable to unlawful IRS grants of tax exemptions only if there
were enough racially discriminatory private schools receiving tax exemptions in
[plaintiffs'] communities for withdrawal of those exemptions to make an appreciable difference in public school integration.... Moreover, it is entirely speculative... whether withdrawal of a tax exemption from any particular school would
lead the school to change its policies. Id. at 758.
103. See infra notes 132-51 and accompanying text.
104. 515 U.S. 200, 249 (1995) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
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persons excluded from an affirmative action policy lack standing to claim
that the policy perpetuates damaging stereotypes about its supposed beneficiaries. 105 According to Stevens' logic, boys denied access to all-girl math
and science classes could not assert, as the basis of their constitutional
injury, that such classes reinforce female subordination. By sustaining a
man's challenge to an all-female program on the grounds that the program
promoted gender stereotypes, the Hogan Court seemed to take a more expansive view than Stevens did in Adarand. °6 Yet, the Hogan Court did
not confront a standing issue because Joe Hogan also alleged individual
harms arising from his exclusion from the nursing school. To the extent
that Hogan authorizes men to complain of injuries inflicted solely on women, it ought to be overturned. Contrary to the Hogan majority, a male
plaintiff should not be able to request damages or even injunctive relief
because a single-sex program diminishes society's respect for women.
Such a grievance is more properly raised by females.
b.

Female Plaintiffs

Programs for girls that seek to redress historical disadvantages carry
the baggage of victimhood along with the hope of empowerment. From
the perspective of some feminist attorneys, it is the benefit that segregated
classes confer on females, rather than the need to combat sex discrimination, that remains open to question. Indeed, feminist lawyers and researchers number among the most vocal opponents of the pilot programs,10 7 and
girls' parents may be more likely than boys' parents to file suit.
A female plaintiff's range of legally cognizable harms is circumscribed by her ability to choose or decline enrollment in the contested programs; yet, she can still allege both individual and group injuries. A
female student who thrives in a coed environment may find her individual
achievements compromised when the state transforms the group against
which she competes academically into either a predominantly male cohort
105. See id. at 247 n.5 (opining that Adarand Constructors, a white-owned business,
lacked standing to advance an argument that the most significant cost associated with an
affirmative-action program designed to benefit African Americans was its "adverse stigmatic effect" on blacks). Id.
106. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 729 (1982).
107. See, e.g., Riechmann, supra note 8, at 36 (discussing criticisms by Martha Davis,
senior staff attorney for the NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund, and Leslie Wolfe,
President of the Center for Women Policy Studies in Washington D.C.); see also Interview
with teacher Pam Belitski (NBC '"Today Show"), supra note 67 (broadcasting Leslie
Wolfe's concern that the programs will make girls think they need special help); Hancock
& Kalb, supra note 10, at 76 (stating that Norma Cantu of the Office of Civil Rights and
others "worry that segregated classes will set back the cause of gender equity just when
girls are finally being integrated into all-male academies").
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(if she chooses the nominally coed option) or an entirely female one (if she
opts for an all-female math class). In either scenario, her educational experience and others' estimation of it will be different and, arguably, less
favorable than if the state had not tinkered with coeducation.
With regard to group rights, feminist critics of experimental math and
science classes contend that a return to single-sex instruction will resurrect
the bad old days when girls were given just enough knowledge to make
them entertaining wives.108 Norma Cantu of the U.S. Office of Civil Rights
recalls that, earlier in this century, male students learned that pharmaceutical companies derive penicillin from mold, while girls learned how to remove mold from the shower curtain.' 9 Some feminists believe that
female-only math and science classes will foster a culture of inferiority
among females, reinforce the males' sense of entitlement, and result in two
academic tracks: serious classes for boys and watered-down, non-competitive classes for girls. 1 0
I do not believe that the courts should find an invasion of females'
equal protection rights unless the single-sex classes assume biologicallydetermined female inferiority or provide girls with fewer financial resources than boys. However, the dangers of stigmatizing the supposed
beneficiaries of remedial affirmative action programs should not be dismissed casually; I will discuss them in greater detail later in this article. 1"
2.

Separate is Not Inherently Unequal
a. De Jure and De Facto Gender Segregation

The Supreme Court has declined to engage in a "separate but equal"
analysis where the state provides a single-sex option for only one sex." 2
However, a school that offers an all-male class, as well as a special pro108. See, e.g., Hancock & Kalb, supra note 10, at 76 (discussing the aesthetic and home
economic focus of all-female science classes earlier in this century); Rhode, supra note 11,
at 131-32 (noting that Smith College catalogs from the early 1900s promised that a Smith
education would not make women compete like men).
109. See Hancock & Kalb, supra note 10, at 76 (quoting Norma Cantu of the U.S. Office
of Civil Rights).
110. See id. (citing Cantu for the inference that segregated classes will undercut gender
equity by providing inferior academic preparation for girls); Interview with teacher Pam
Belitski (NBC "Today Show"), supra note 67 (discussing the disadvantages of single-sex
math and science with Leslie Wolfe of the Center for Women Policy Studies in Washington, D.C.); Riechmann, supra note 8, at 36 (describing the opposition of NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund attorney Martha Davis to classes that "suggest that girls learn
[math or science] at a slower pace or that they can't be competitive").
111. See infra notes 161-64 and accompanying text.
112. See supra note 79-80 and accompanying text.
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gram for girls, must survive the heightened scrutiny mandated for all gender-based classifications."'
Nominally coed courses that have the purpose and effect of dividing
students by sex also give challengers a colorable claim of governmentsponsored gender discrimination. Encouraging the exodus of female students from regular math and science classes promotes de facto segregation
by disturbing the gender balance of the coed classrooms. A situation in
which almost all the female students elect to enroll in special classes that
the boys eschew, or to which the boys are denied access, is not far-fetched.
The legality of such defacto gender separation remains unclear. Given the
Court's reluctance to mandate remedies for de facto segregation, programs
theoretically open to boys might pass muster if the state showed a neutral
reason for the gender imbalance."I4 Yet most de facto segregation cases
deal with race," 5 and rulings in the racial context do not provide an uncomplicated guide to the legality of gender separation. Nor does the
Court's tolerance of de facto segregation in particular municipal settings
endorse its existence as a general principle. In PersonnelAdministrator of
Massachusetts v. Feeney," 6 a gender discrimination case attacking the
state of Massachusetts' preference for war veterans in civil service hiring,
the challenger of a facially-neutral program had to prove that the state acted "because of," and not merely "in spite of' the discriminatory effect." 7
However, Feeney proved to be an anomaly. Indeed, the touchstone of gender discrimination cases has been the use of impermissibly broad generalizations about the sexes, rather than the existence of discriminatory
purpose. 118
113. See generally United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2286 (1996) (reiterating
that all gender-based classifications must undergo heightened scrutiny). See also infra note
121 and accompanying text.
114. See Personnel Admin'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 277, 279 (1979) (holding
that a female plaintiff failed to show that the state acted with discriminatory intent in giving
priority in civil service hiring to war veterans, almost all of whom would be male). In the
context of racial desegregation, the Court distinguishes between de jure and defacto segregation on the basis of a school district's intent to keep blacks and whites apart. See Milliken
v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 735 (1974) (refusing to impose a multi-district remedy where
only one of the districts engaged in de jure racial segregation). According to the Milliken
Court, "The target of the Brown holding was clear and forthright: the elimination of statemandated and deliberately maintained dual school systems .... Id. (emphasis added).
See also Keyes v. School District, 413 U.S. 189, 210 (1973) ("[The school authorities']
burden is to adduce proof sufficient to support a finding that segregative intent was not
among the factors that motivated their actions.").
115. See e.g., Milliken, 418 U.S. at 735; Keyes, 413 U.S. at 210.

116. 442 U.S. at 279 (1979).
117. Id. at 279.
118. The Supreme Court, 1980 Term, Gender-basedStatutory Rape Laws, 95 HARv.L.
REV. 93, 175-77.
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Schools that have opened special math classes to males, as well as
females, have been careless about exposing their underlying motives. For
example, a journalist covering the decision to make freshman algebra
courses in Presque Isle coeducational reported that "[o]fficials are just hoping ...[boys] won't sign up."1' 19 Quickly modified to avoid legal repercussions, the classes remain directed at the needs of female students.
Although the Court has not often focused on discriminatory purpose in
gender cases under the Equal Protection Clause,' 2 ° it might look askance at
coed classes for "underrepresented students" in which no boys actually enrolled. Thus, both the official and unofficial versions of all-female math
and science classes are vulnerable to attack.
Challengers of de jure and de facto gender separation face some impediments, however. The Supreme Court has never held that educational
facilities separated on the basis of sex are inherently unequal, even when
such segregation is official and blatant. Writing for the majority in Virginia, Justice Ginsburg required that separate facilities for men and women show "substantial equality" but not that they be eliminated
altogether. 121
The state of Virginia failed to meet the substantial equality standard.' 2 2 Hastily established to satisfy the judiciary, Virginia Women's Institute for Leadership (VWIL) used seminars and externships, instead of
mental stress, indoctrination, and physical challenges, to prepare its female
students for military and civic life.' 23 VWIL differed dramatically from
VMI in terms of its physical facilities; it provided neither barracks-style
living nor state-of-the-art sports fields.' 2 4 It also lacked those intangible
factors that the Court in Sweatt v. Painterdeclared "make for greatness in
a... school": 125 prestigious faculty, diverse curriculum, and an extensive
26
network of successful alumnae.'
119. See Presque Isle, supra note 9,at 2.
120. See Gender-basedStatutory Rape Laws, supra note 118, at 175-77.

121. See United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2286 (1996).
122. See id.

123. See id. at 2283 (discussing the substantive differences in the training provided by
VMI and VWIL).
124. See id. at 2283-85.

125. See Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634 (1950) (holding that the Equal Protection
Clause required an all-white law school to admit a black applicant because the educational
opportunities offered to whites and blacks at separate law schools were not substantially
equal).
126. See Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2285 (quoting Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634
(1950)) (concluding that the extreme differences in opportunities at VMI and VWIL denied
"substantial equality" of educational opportunities).
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Without foreclosing all forms of single-sex education, Virginia implicitly overturned the Third Circuit opinion in Vorchheimer v. School
Dist. of Philadelphia,127 the case that Judge Gibbons characterized as "a
twentieth-century sexual equivalent of Plessy."'2 8 Although the Third Cir-

cuit found educational opportunities for both sexes in Philadelphia essentially equal, 12 9 the current Supreme Court certainly would have disagreed
because the schools that girls could attend had inferior scientific
facilities.13
Recent experiments with all-female math and science classes constitute the inverse of the programs challenged in Virginia and Vorchheimer,
for they seek to give girls more attention in male-dominated subjects.

Moreover, they require the girls' consent. Thus, neither Virginia nor
Vorchheimer mandates a finding that such courses are unconstitutional.
b. Brown and the IntegrationistMandate: Useful Parallels
from the Racial DesegregationBattle
The distinction between the levels of scrutiny for gender- and race-

based classifications13 1 obscures an important insight about separatism in
general: that the harm may depend upon whether segregation is freely cho-

sen by members of a subordinated group or imposed as a means of denying
them full citizenship. In the context of racial separation, the integrationist
mandate of Brown'3 2 has often been exaggerated.' 33 The Supreme Court
appeared to presume, in the immediate post-Brown era, that race had no
127. 532 F.2d 880, 888 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 703 (1977) (upholding an
all-male admissions policy at a public high school in Philadelphia).
128. Id. at 889 (Gibbons, J.,
dissenting).
129. See id. at 882 (noting that both the girls' and boys' schools had high academic
standing, successful alumni, and about the same number of students). Enrollment at either a
single-sex or coeducational school was voluntary, not by assignment. Hence, the court held
that the Equal Educational Opportunity Act would not have applied, even if it were sufficiently clear on the issue of sex-segregation to be controlling. See id. at 882, 884.
130. See id. at 882 (admitting that the all-male school was superior in science).
131. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2275 (1996). The Supreme
Court did not find that a law disfavoring women violated equal protection until 1971. See
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 73 (1971). It now employs intermediate scrutiny for gender
classifications and strict scrutiny for race-based distinctions. See, e.g. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at
2275 & n.6. One can speculate that the Court's slowness to recognize gender discrimination and the lesser standard eventually adopted to scrutinize it stemmed from the view that
"the chief and all-dominating purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to ensure equal
protection for the Negro." Charles Black, The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69

L.J. 421, 423 (1960) (exemplifying one perception of the Fourteenth Amendment's
goals).
132. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that segregation of
black and white children in public schools on the basis of race denies equal protection of the
laws, even though physical facilities may be equal).
YALE
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proper relevance for the state and that the wrong of segregation inhered in

its racial basis.' 34 Advocates of race-blindness contend that whites also
experience harm when they are excluded from public activities and that
racism can be prevented only when the state treats its citizens as individuals and forbids racial considerations from affecting any publicly-funded
program135 Thus, according to Alexander Bickel and others, the revival of

racial classifications for the benefit of minority groups has merely changed
"whose ox is gored."1'36

Whether articulated by liberals or conservatives, the integrationist or
anti-differentiation perspective arguably ignores the extent to which the
dominant educational culture remains white and male. 137 The recognition
that integrated, coeducational schools have neither cured racial disharmony, nor eradicated sexism, requires a fresh look at the meaning of
Brown. The Warren Court did not unambiguously uphold the constitutional right of all citizens to an integrated education. Indeed, read closely,

the landmark opinion in Brown is limited by its specific social and historical context.

133. See, e.g., Colker, supra note 13, at 1022 ("Post-Brown courts have focused on the
strong anti-differentiation statement from the Brown Court, namely, that separate can never
be equal, and overlooked that Court's central concern for remedying the subordination of
blacks.").
134. See Van Alstyne, supra note 12, at 783-92, 795 (discussing the Court's "second rite
of passage" in which it sought, with the post-Brown per curiam decisions, to eradicate racial
classifications from governmental programs).
135. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MoALrm OF CONSENT 133 (1975) ("Those for
whom racial equality was demanded are to be more equal than others. Having found support in the Constitution for equality, they now claim support for inequality under the same
Constitution."); see also, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Tuskegee Modem, or Group Rights

under the Constitution, 80 Ky. L.J. 869, 882 (1992) ("All too often we hear today that
women and minorities should never be excluded from any organization that they wish to
join for reasons of sex or race, but should have the power to exclude others from the organizations that they wish to form. The risks of this special pleading are serious."); Van Alstyne, supra note 12, at 797 ("[The compelling purpose test) is not, I think, a constitutional
standard at all. It is, rather, a sieve-a sieve that encourages renewed race-based laws,
racial discrimination, racial competition, racial spoils systems, and mere judicial sport. It is
Plessy v. Ferguson all over again, in new and modish dress.").
136. BICKEL, supra note 135, at 133.
137. Gary Peller has noted, for instance, that, in the view of black nationalists, liberal
integrationism assumes the superiority of white middle class values and seeks to impose
such values on blacks by mandating mixed-race schools. See Peller, supra note 100, at 78283 (discussing the views of Stokely Carmichael and others). See also JAWANZA KUNJuLFU,
COUNTERING THE CONSPIRACY To DESTROY BLACK Boys (1986) (contending that white
pedagogy dominates American schools at the expense of black boys' intellectual and social
development); see infra notes 274-77 and accompanying text (considering whether masculine ways of learning pervade and are reinforced in public school classrooms).
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Such diverse commentators as Charles Black and Malcolm X have
argued that the evil of segregated schooling lay in its social meaning in the
1950s. 138 As the Warren Court observed, the text and history of the Equal
Protection Clause are "inconclusive" with respect to "its intended effect on
'
Because there was no tax-supported school system in
public education." 139
the South when the Fourteenth Amendment was drafted, Brown purported
to address educational problems extant in the Warren Court era, 140 not
those present in 1868 or 1999. Thus, even Bickel, who later decried minority entitlements, contended in the 1950s that the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment eschewed enumerated rights in favor of generalities that could
be adapted to the "moral and material state of the nation in 1954." 1"
Although Black took issue with Bickel's historical arguments, 42 he declined to label all forms of segregation unconstitutional discrimination.143
138. See Black, supra note 131, at 428 ("The fourteenth amendment commands equality,
and segregation as we know it is inequality") (emphasis added). Black places school segregation in the social context of the mid-twentieth century South in which African-Americans
were "subjected to the strictest codes of 'unwritten law' as to job opportunities, social intercourse, patterns of housing, going to the back door, being called by the first name, saying
'Sir' and the rest of the whole sorry business." Id. at 425. As to the intent of the framers of
the Fourteenth Amendment, he noted that, because they "were unacquainted
with... [segregation] as it prevails in the American South today," they "have bequeathed
us only their generalities." Id. at 424; see also Peller, supra note 100, at 782 (noting that
Malcolm X saw both Southern school segregation and liberal integrationism as manifestations of white supremacy); Charles Lawrence, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist
Speech on Campus, 1990 DuKE L.J. 431, 439 (1990). Seeking to establish that Brown was
a case about speech regulation, Lawrence argued: "Brown held that segregated schools were
unconstitutional primarily because of the message segregation conveys-the message that
black children are an untouchable caste, unfit to be educated with white children." Id. Yet,
Lawrence also asserted that "[d]iscriminatory conduct is not racist unless it also conveys a
message of white supremacy." Id. at 444 (emphasis added).
139. Brown, 347 U.S. at 489-90.
140. See id. at 492-93. Justice Warren declared: "In approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, or even to
1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was written. We must consider public education in light of
its full development and its present place in American life throughout the nation." Id. (emphasis added).
141. Alexander Bickel, The Original Understanding of the Segregation Decision, 69
HARv. L. REv. 1, 65 (1955) ("[T]he court could have faced the embarrassment of...
formulating ...an explicit theory rationalizing such a course. The court, of course [did not].
It was able to avoid the dilemma because the record of history, properly understood, left the
law open to, in fact invited, a decision based on the moral and material state of the nation in
1954, not 1866.").
142. See Black, supra note 131, at 423 & n.14 (expressing skepticism about Bickel's use
of the legislative history of the 1866 Civil Rights Bill to ascertain the intent behind the
Fourteenth Amendment).
143. Black commented:
I think that some of the artificial... puzzlement called into being around this
question originates in a single fundamental mistake. The issue is seen in terms of
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Instead, he argued that forcing African-American children into a position
of "walled-off inferiority" in Southern schools violated the Fourteenth
Amendment." 4
Malcolm X and, more recently, Charles Lawrence have identified the
wrong at issue in Brown as the message of white supremacy conveyed
through the forcible division of the races. 145 Malcolm X believed that "the
problem with school 'segregation' was not the failure to integrate ...but
rather the dynamics of power and control that formed the historical context
of racial separation."' 46 Black children felt inferior, not because they had
their own school, but because white officials forced them to go to it and
because it lacked the intangible, and often tangible, benefits that white
schools enjoyed. Basing the illegality of school segregation on psychological data about its effects on the subordinated group, 47 the Warren Court
left open the possibility that some forms of separation might not cause
48
constitutionally recognized harms.'
From a constitutional perspective, then, the state could make a strong
argument for allowing blacks to study in isolation if they prefer to do so
and if pedagogical evidence shows that all-black schools further a compelling state interest. The same is true for voluntary all-female classes. Indeed, in the case of all-female classes, the government need only espouse
"important" objectives.149 If teachers and male students create a sexist culwhat might be called the metaphysics of sociology: "Must Segregation Amount
to Discrimination?" That is an interesting question ....But it is not our question.
Our question is whether discrimination inheres in that segregation which is imposed by law in the twentieth century in certain specific states in the American
Union.
Id. at 427.
144. Id.
145. See Lawrence, supra note 138, at 444 ("Segregation serves its purpose by conveying an idea. It stamps a badge of inferiority upon blacks, and this badge communicates a
message to others in the community, as well as to blacks wearing the badge, that is injurious
to blacks.") Id. at 439-40; Peller, supra note 101, at 782 (discussing Malcolm X's views of
Brown).
146. Peller, supra note 100, at 782.
147. See James A. Washburn, Note, Beyond Brown: EvaluatingEquality in Higher Education, 43 DuKE L.J. 1115, 1120 (1994) ("If segregative conditions were found not to cause
any feelings of racial inferiority, following the logic of Brown, a law mandating racial
segregation would be constitutional."). I do not share Washburn's assumption that the state
could impose segregation on blacks under certain circumstances. I do believe, however,
that the Warren Court left open the possibility that a minority group could choose educational separatism, if the races continued to enjoy equal facilities.
148. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 493 (endorsing the view that "[s]egregation with the sanction of law... has a tendency to [retard] the educational and mental development of Negro
children" because it makes them feel inferior to whites).
149. See infra notes 154-55 and accompanying text.
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ture in coed classrooms and this culture pushes girls out of math and science before they reach an advanced level, voluntary all-female education
may invest girls with a greater sense of self-worth than coeducation does.
The broader import of Brown, divorced from the historical moment in
which the Warren Court delivered its opinion, was to invalidate legallymandated separation that "generates a feeling of inferiority [in a
subordinated group] as to their status in the community."' 0 If coeducation
has failed to nourish the "hearts and minds"'' of American girls, the
courts will violate the spirit of Brown if they forbid voluntary participation
in all-female classes.
3.

The Blurred Line Between Compensation and Condescension
a. The State's Remedial Purpose

When boys challenge their exclusion from a program conferring benefits on girls, they advance a reverse discrimination claim against an affirmative action policy. The state has an important interest in remedying
female students' lagging performance on standardized math and science
exams and in encouraging girls to take advanced courses. However, opponents of girls-only math and science classes can attack this objective in two
ways: first, by presenting factual evidence that the disparities between the
sexes are small or non-existent;' 5 2 and, second, by rejecting the means chosen to achieve the state's goals. The first approach, which a male plaintiff
is likely to adopt, suggests that the state wishes to advance females beyond
parity, rather than merely leveling the playing field. The second argument
raises the fear that gender segregation stigmatizes girls, even when the state
offers a remedial rationale.
Ironically, considering the Fourteenth Amendment's mission to end
discrimination against former slaves, the courts subject remedial gender
preferences to less rigorous review than race-based compensatory
schemes.' 53 All gender classifications, whether invidious or benign, undergo intermediate judicial scrutiny.' 5 4 There are several possible explana150. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 494.
151. See id.
152. For example, although the 1992 AAUW Report reported that boys did better than
girls in every math subject except algebra by the end of high school, the authors noted that
"[g]ender differences in mathematics achievement are small and declining." See How
SCHOOLS SHORTCHANGE GnuS, supra note 31, at 24.
153. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 247 (1995) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing the majority for making it more difficult to sustain race-based affirmative action than gender preferences).
154. See United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2274 (1996) (holding that intermediate scrutiny is to be applied in cases involving gender classifications); Mississippi Univ. for
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723 (1982). But see Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2306 (Scalia,
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tions for the Court's adoption of a lower standard for sex-based distinctions
than that used for race. The fact that women can claim few historical instances of oppression as pandemic and degrading as the enslavement of
blacks explains why the court shows greater deference to classifications

that may affect women negatively, but it does not justify the relative ease
with which the state can defend gender-based affirmative action. Another
justification for intermediate scrutiny stems from the reluctance of both
liberal and conservative justices to deny the existence of sexual differences.' 5 5 Yet, hesitancy to embrace anti-differentiation in the context of
gender does not amount to an unqualified endorsement of compensatory
and affirmative action policies.
According to Hogan, the state cannot "'protect' members of one gender because they are presumed to suffer from an inherent handicap,"' 5 6 nor

can it create an automatic shield against further inquiry by articulating a
remedial purpose.' 57 The Hogan Court invalidated the single-sex admis-

sions policy at MUW's nursing school because it made "the assumption
that nursing is a field for women a self-fulfilling prophecy."' 58 However,
as Justice Burger noted in his dissenting opinion, the majority left open the

possibility that "a State might well be justified in maintaining.., the option of an all-women's business school or liberal arts program."' 59 Hogan
thus contains the seeds of an anti-subordination argument, for it seems to

distinguish between programs that ameliorate the position of a
subordinated group and those that reinforce the status quo.
The Court has done little to clarify the boundary between permissible

and impermissible notions about a subordinated group's position in sociJ., dissenting) ("And the rationale of today's decision is sweeping: for sex-based classifications, a redefinition of intermediate scrutiny that makes it indistinguishable from strict scrutiny."). Although Justice Scalia criticizes Justice Ginsburg for using the phrase
"exceedingly persuasive justification" nine times in her majority opinion, see id. at 2294,
Justice O'Connor linked the phrase in Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan to the familiar
"substantial relation" test. See Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724. Thus, the Court is unlikely to depart
from the intermediate tier of review in future sex discrimination cases.
155. See, e.g., Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2276. The Court stated:
The heightened review standard our precedent establishes does not make sex a
proscribed classification . .

.

. Physical differences between men and wo-

men... are enduring: "[The two sexes are not fungible; a community made up
exclusively of one [sex] is different from a community composed of both."
Id. (quoting Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 193 (1946)).
156. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 725.
157. See id. at 728 (quoting Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 (1975)).
158. See id. at 730.
159. Id. at 733 (Burger, J., dissenting); see also id. at 723 n.7 (declining to "address the
question of whether MUW's admissions policy, as applied to males seeking admission to
schools other than the School of Nursing, violates the Fourteenth Amendment.").
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ety, however. 160 Women may need their own math and science courses
because they have suffered harassment and neglect in coed classrooms, or
because males and females have incompatible learning styles. Yet, when
educators explain the reasons for single-sex pilot programs, they often veer
dangerously close to proscribed "generalizations about 'the way women
are' "161 -slower to think, less likely to shout out answers, more eager to
help their classmates. 62 Black Americans anxious to improve the pros-

pects for inner-city youth grapple with a similar dilemma. For example,
Jawanza Kunjufu argues that black males feel alienated in schools pervaded by "white" teaching methods because blacks tend to be right-brained
and thus to learn in relational ways that white teachers ignore. 6 3 Such
remarks exemplify the danger that, in emphasizing and even celebrating
cultural difference, reformers will inadvertently stereotype and marginalize
subordinated groups. If the distinction between genetic inferiority and socially-constructed disadvantage gets lost in the shuffle, the courts, the public, and perhaps the subordinated group itself will perceive only the
message of helplessness. Stigmatic injury to females is too remote for a
male plaintiff to raise,"6 but a female student concerned about the quality
of her academic credentials may suffer actual injury from an ill-considered

remedial approach.
Walking the fine line between a legitimate compensatory purpose and
illegitimate role-typing, schools face two evidentiary problems. First,

although statistics corroborate girls' under-achievement in mathematical
and scientific fields, much of the evidence of classroom bias is anecdotal.165 Second, schools that admit that their counselors and teachers have
160. For example, in Califano v. Webster, the Court decided that a gender preference
based on women's typically low earnings compared to men's was not an archaic and overbroad generalization. See 430 U.S. 313 (1977). Yet, that same term, the plurality in
Califano v. Goldfarb, viewed the assumption that wives are usually dependent on their
husbands' income as impermissible. See 430 U.S. 199 (1977).
161. See, e.g., Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264 at 2284.
162. See e.g., Davis, supranote 9 (quoting a Ventura High School math teacher who says
that "boys are more task-oriented while girls are a little slower because they want to make
sure everyone understands").
163. See KuNjumU, supra note 137, at 14, 34-35. Kunjufu explicitly characterizes black
boys' dress, holistic learning style, musical taste, and verbal sparring rituals known as the
"dozens" as cultural strengths. See id. at 14-18. He contends that "we cannot afford to have
teachers placing negative value judgments on Black culture." Id. at 14. However, despite
his affirmation of black male values, Kunjufu may perpetuate an undesirable gulf between
black and white, male and female, by emphasizing that African-American boys must be
taught differently.
164. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
165. See generally SAtriEaR & SADKER, FAHING AT FAnuiEss, supra note 8, at ix-x
(presenting evidence gleaned from "thousands of hours of classroom observation" in elementary through high school classes). The Sadkers used "objective and systematic" means
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systematically ignored girls' needs expose themselves to crushing liability
in suits by female plaintiffs. Ifevidence of specific instances of discrimination is required, public officials will have strong incentives to settle out
of court.
A school may not need to make a particularized showing of bias
against women, however. While "societal discrimination without more"
does not sustain racial preferences,' 6 6 the landscape is less clear with regard to gender. 6 7 In Califano v. Webster,'6 ' for instance, the Court used
intermediate scrutiny to uphold a statute allowing women to exclude more
low-earning years than men could in the computation of retirement benefits.' 6 9 The Court did not demand evidence of past discrimination against
every woman who benefited from the statute; rather, the classification survived because it held true in the aggregate.' 70 Moreover, past wage inequalities were compensable "whether [they arose] from overt
discrimination orfrom the socializationprocess of a male-dominated culture."171 Califano thus indicates that extant research on gender disparities
in test scores and classroom interaction adequately corroborates the remedial purpose of all-female math and science programs.
Secondary-school boys still enjoy an academic edge in math and science.' 72 As long as schools merely seek to level the playing field, the
introduction of remedial classes for girls furthers an important social end
that outweighs a male plaintiff's interest in gender neutrality. Moreover,
the argument that single-sex education is legally available in private
schools ignores an important function of public education: the provision of
equal opportunities for all children, regardless of socioeconomic class. If
state-funded schools shortchange girls, it should not be only affluent females who can seek a remedy for their flagging academic performance.
b. Substantial Relationship Between Means and Ends
Feminist detractors of the pilot programs attack the means the state
has chosen to remedy female disadvantage, rather than the remedial goal
of analyzing information gathered by trained "raters." Id. However, much of the book is
recounted in anecdotal form, which makes its accuracy difficult to assess.
166. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986) (plurality) (subjecting race-based preferences of teacher lay-offs to strict scrutiny).
167. Id. at 276 ("Societal discrimination, without more, is too amorphous a basis for
imposing a racially classified remedy.").
168. 430 U.S. 313 (1977).
169. See id.
170. See id. at 318 n.5.
171. Id. at 318 (quoting Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 353 (1974)) (emphasis added).

172. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
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itself.'7 3 In legal terms, female plaintiffs are likely to focus their opposition on the imperfect fit between the single-sex format and the goal of
encouraging girls to excel in math and science. Does the mere presence of
the boys cause the trouble? Does separating the girls substantially improve
their performance? Or do we need far-reaching changes that make classroom culture more conducive to achievement by both sexes?
Critics of the current state of coeducational schooling worry about the
harassment of girls by boys.' 74 But the attitudes of teachers, administra75
tors, and parents seem to represent an even more pervasive concern.'
One study reports that counselors openly admit to discouraging female students from advanced mathematical study. 1 76 Similarly, mothers may refrain from demanding a high level of performance from their daughters
because they remember their own discomfort in male-dominated math and
science classes. 177 These factors, combined with the finding that teachers
inhibit girls from developing independent thought patterns, 17 say less
about the need for a single-sex environment than they do about the importance of reforming coed classrooms.
However, while educators have not exhausted all of the alternatives to
single-sex education, equal protection law does not require them to do so.
Under intermediate scrutiny, the fit between means and ends must be "substantial,"'1 79 but the state does not have choose the least restrictive alternative.18 0 Moreover, despite speculation about the drawbacks of single-sex
classes, studies showing that voluntary enrollment in all-female secondary
schools and universities has positive effects on women's self-esteem and
subsequent achievement undermine the argument that voluntary segregation stigmatizes its participants.' 8 ' There may be significant differences
between an institution that accepts only girls and a girls-only island in a
coeducational facility, but research on the benefits of single-sex schools
suggests that educational choice minimizes the stigma attached to

segregation. 182
173. See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 35-37, 43-45 and accompanying text.
176. See Stage et al., supra note 19, at 242-43.
177. See id. at 242.

178. See Fennema & Patterson, supra note 19, at 27.
179. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) (describing
the requirements for a gender classification to survive intermediate judicial scrutiny).
180. See United States v. Virginia, 116 S.Ct. 2264, 2294 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(citing Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (per curiam)).
181. See infra notes 184-90 and accompanying text.

182. See id.
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For example, Valerie Lee and Helen Marks followed students from
their sophomore year in seventy-five Catholic high schools until their junior year in college and determined that girls who attended all-female secondary institutions had fewer stereotypical views of gender roles, a greater
orientation towards "challenge and prestige in the workplace," and more
interest in politics than their counterparts from coed schools. 8 The girls
from single-sex high schools enrolled in prestigious universities in greater
numbers and often chose mixed-gender undergraduate institutions, defying
the notion that females adapt poorly to coed environments after being
cloistered from boys.184
Even a sustained preference for all-female instruction seems to have
few debilitating effects. Statistics show that graduates of women's colleges
are two to three times more likely to go to medical school than their coed
counterparts, 8 5 and Seven Sisters alumnae account for forty-three percent
of the math doctorates and fifty percent of the engineering Ph.Ds earned by
186
women.

As a student note about all-black education suggests, feelings of inferiority seem to arise from a lack of choice.' 87 Thus, "children [voluntarily

enrolled] in African-American immersion schools may feel that they are no
longer being ignored by their educational system-that they are a priority.
The children might even feel special, and perhaps that feeling may drive

them to try even harder to succeed."' 88 For similar reasons, girls taught in
a single-sex environment seem to shed perceptions of science and math as
masculine preserves 189 and learn to speak their minds in the lecture hall
and the laboratory. 19 0
183. See Lee & Marks, supra note 18, at 582-85. It is imperative to note that Lee has
called single-sex math classes in coed schools "a bogus answer to a complex problem." See
Hancock & Kalb, supra note 10, at 76. I cite Lee and Mark's study of Catholic high school
students to rebut the idea that gender segregation always stigmatizes females, not to imply
that Lee supports the girls-only math and science pilot programs.
184. See Lee & Marks, supra note 18, at 581, 583.
185. See SADKER & SADKER, FAILING AT FAm'Rmwss, supra note 8, at 233 (citing Yadwiga
Sebrechts, The Cultivation of Scientists at Women's Colleges, 4 J. NIH Ras. 22-26 (1992)).
186. See Susan Estrich, Bias at the Blackboard,SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., May 29, 1994,
at 14Z3 (listing Barnard, Bryn Mawr, Mount Holyoke, Smith, and Wellesley as examples of
all-women's colleges whose graduates earn these advanced degrees).
187. See Michael John Weber, Immersed in an EducationalCrisis:Alternative Programs
for African-American Males, 45 STAN. L. RPsv. 1099, 1118 (1993).
188. Id.
189. See Marland, supra note 49, at 181.
190. See SADCER & SADKER, FAMING AT FAiRNFss, supra note 8, at 248-49 (citing a
Yale undergraduate thesis which "found that the women from single-sex schools were not
only more assertive than women from coed institutions but they were more assertive than
the men as well").
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The Supreme Court's holdings in the equal protection area invalidate
the use of "gender as an inaccurate proxy for other, more germane bases of
classification."' 191 For example, in Craig v. Boren, the Court found the
relationship of males' slightly higher rate of alcohol-related traffic accidents to the regulation of beer sales too insubstantial to necessitate a gender
distinction. 192 Independent variables contributing to the success of singlesex math and science programs arguably pose Craig-type problems. The
enthusiasm surrounding the inauguration of a special project, the use of
novel teaching methods, and the gender make-up of the faculty might explain the increased confidence of girls in single-sex classes.
However, the state's argument in Craig involved leaps of logic that
are not required in the case of all-girls math and science. Oklahoma offered statistics about driving to corroborate a gender distinction in the regulation of beer sales and asked the Court to infer that men who cannot buy
alcohol legally will not drink and drive.' 93 The single-sex education argument is much less improbable. Even if the absence of boys is not the only
factor that raises girls' achievement, it undeniably plays an important part.
Teachers who treat the sexes equally can devote only fifty percent of their
time to female students in a perfectly gender-balanced classroom, and studies like the AAUW Report show that, in fact, boys ask and answer almost
every substantive question.19 4 In an all-female class, on the other hand,

girls get one hundred percent of the attention.
Choosing the single-sex option may not be the best solution to girls'
math and science woes, but the existence of alternatives does not make
programs founded on concrete pedagogical evidence unconstitutional. The
pilot math and science classes target a discrete time window in the educational career of adolescents when peer pressure from the opposite sex is the
greatest. The short-term, voluntary nature of the programs, in addition to
their avowed aim of improving girls' academic performance, affects the
social message they convey. In short, they do not embody the evils against
which Brown or Hogan sought to protect.
I.

The Title IX Patchwork

Title IX erects a formidable hurdle to the establishment of single-sex
classes in coed schools. Because it can be enforced administratively, the
statute threatens educational institutions with the loss of federal funds for
offending programs, even if no plaintiff alleges harm. The legislators who
191.
192.
193.
194.

Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198 (1976).
See id. at 204.
See id. at 200-01.
See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
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drafted Title IX stitched together an odd assortment of prohibitions and
exemptions. The result is a statute that theoretically forbids any program
that receives federal financial assistance from excluding, discriminating
against, or denying benefits to any person on the basis of sex19 but that is,
in fact, riddled with loopholes. For example, the act implicitly exempts
from regulation the admissions policies of secondary and elementary
schools,196 as well as public universities that have been traditionally and
continually single-sex.' 97 It allows gender-based associations like fraternities and sororities, 198 Boys' and Girls' State conferences, 199 and beauty
pageants, 20 0 and exempts religious and military institutions. 201
Despite the legislature's deference toward a grab-bag of gender distinctions, courts have invoked Title IX to invalidate single-sex programs.
For example, in Garrettv. Board of Education,22 a case involving three
black male academies, the Eastern District of Michigan interpreted Title IX
to preclude new gender-based admissions policies and suggested that
prohibitions against "different aid, benefits, or services" bar special educational offerings for one sex.2" 3 Exploring the legal status of girls' math and
science classes in light of Garrett exposes a contradiction between the
safeguards against asymmetry that are built into the text of Title IX and the
goals articulated on the Senate floor. The Garrett court refused to accept
"gender as a proxy for 'at-risk' students" or to equate under-achievement
with the presence of the opposite sex.2' Moreover, it was unsympathetic
to the defendant's use of a remedial argument based on the Title IX imple195. See Title IX of the Education Act Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)
(1994).
196. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(1) (stating that "in regard to admissions to educational
institutions, this section shall apply only to institutions of vocational education, professional
education, and graduate higher education, and to public institutions of undergraduate higher
education"). Secondary and elementary school admissions policies are thus exempted by

omission. See id.
197. See id. § 1681(a)(5).
198. See id. § 1681(a)(6)(A).

199. See id. § 1681(a)(7).
200. See id. § 1681(a)(9).

201. See id. § 1681(a)(3)-(4).
202. 775 F. Supp. 1004 (E.D. Mich. 1991).
203. See id. at 1008-09. The court viewed the "exemption for admissions as applicable
primarily to historically pre-existing single-sex schools [and not as] authorization to establish new single-sex schools." Id. at 1009. Moreover, it noted that "it is unclear.., whether
all of the course offerings at the Academies can be had at any one school and from the
evidence before the Court it appears this is not the case." Id. at 1009. Thus, the plaintiff
had a sufficient likelihood of proving that the male-only schools provided different aid and
benefits to obtain a preliminary injunction. See id. at 1008-09.
204. Id. at 1007.
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menting regulations, perhaps because urban girls face problems almost as
great as those afflicting urban boys.2" 5
The black male academies at issue in Garrett differed in significant
ways from all-female math and science programs, however. Not the least
of these differences was the lack of a controlled, scientific study showing
06
the relationship between coeducation and the ills afflicting black males.1
While the Detroit School Board cited statistics demonstrating that ten percent fewer black girls drop out of school, it did not link this slight disparity
to concrete data about teaching methods and male-female interaction in the
classroom.20' Moreover, it could produce only anecdotal evidence about
the success of male Afrocentric programs elsewhere in the country. 8 Because such programs were new, the school board had no data on the sustained achievement of students enrolled in them, and because the ghetto

presents unique racial and economic strains, research on boys' education in
general does not suffice.20 9 The empirical case for the inner-city male
academies is thus weaker than that for all-female math and science classes.
Moreover, while conferring an exclusive benefit on boys flies in the face of
Title IX's objectives, the legislative history indicates an intent to encourage

female entry into traditionally male fields"' 0 and is thus more sympathetic
to the aims of the all-female math and science classes.
A.

The Fate of the Black Male Academies

In August 1991, the Eastern District of Michigan issued a preliminary
injunction halting plans to open three academies for boys. 2 11 The acade205. See id. at 1009-10 (declaring that, because the Office of Civil Rights did not accept
the school board's proffered affirmative action rationale, the plaintiffs met their burden of
showing the likelihood that their Title IX claim would succeed). Although the court did not
expressly link the problems of urban females to the viability of a remedial rationale, the
opinion suggests that the problems in need of remedy were not gender-specific. See id. at
1007.
206. See, Weber, supra note 187, at 1101.
207. See Garrett,775 F. Supp. at 1007 ('The Board has proffered no evidence that the
presence of girls in the classroom bears a substantial relationship to the difficulties facing
urban males.").
208. Some programs for black males have produced positive effects. For example, at
Matthew Henson Elementary School in Baltimore, boys in an all-male third-grade class
improved their test scores, attendance, and discipline records. See Ray, supra note 5, at
A16. Boys who had been absent as many as 35 to 40 days per year only missed two days of
the all-male class. See id.
209. See Weber, supra note 187, at 1101. Of course, proponents of schools for black
boys could argue, as could advocates of girls' math and science classes, that the lack of
long-term data about the benefits of such programs underlines the need for further
experimentation.
210. See infra notes 229-34 and accompanying text.
211. See Garrett,775 F. Supp. at 1006.
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mies would have offered an Afrocentric curriculum emphasizing male responsibility and preparation for futuristic careers for students in preschool
through fifth grade.212 The Detroit School Board planned to pair students
2 13
with male role models and to extend class hours into the weekend.
Although the academies were technically open to boys of all races, they
were located in black neighborhoods, and they specifically targeted the educational problems of black males.2 14
Like its siblings in Baltimore, Milwaukee, and Dade County, Florida,
the Detroit program responded to evidence that, in African-American communities, boys have lower educational attainment than girls. 215 Fifty-four
percent of black males in Detroit fail to finish high school, compared to
forty-five percent of black females in that city, and the boys consistently
score lower on standardized tests in reading and math.21 6 The crisis of the
inner-city and the solutions devised to ameliorate it thus invert the gender
imbalances in mainstream American schools. Rather than nakedly perpetuating male privilege, the Detroit School Board sought to benefit AfricanAmerican males whose academic performance lagged behind that of black
females and was exacerbated by the ever-present specter of violence and
drug abuse.2 17
The courts were not sympathetic to the plans of the Detroit School
Board, however. When the parents of three female students requested injunctive relief, a district judge declared that the exclusion of females did
not bear a substantial relation to improving black male academic performance.2 18 The court also found that, for three reasons, the plaintiffs had a
likelihood of success on their Title IX claims.2 19 First, the admissions ex212. See id. at 1005.
213. See id. (describing the important features of Detroit's male academies).
214. See Note, Inner City Single-Sex Schools: EducationalReform or Invidious Discrimination, 105 HAgv. L. REv. 1741, 1743 (1992).
215. See Ray, supra note 5, at A16; Stout, supra note 5, at A22 (citing evidence that a
disproportionate number of black males drop out of school).
216. See Note, supra note 214, at 1743 (noting that the black male dropout rate in Detroit
is 10 percent higher than that of black females, that black boys do worse on standardized
tests in reading and math, and that they receive 66 percent of all suspensions from school).
217. See Garrett,775 F. Supp. at 1006; see also Note, supra note 214, at 1743.
218. See id. at 1007. While the uncertain connection between excluding girls and improving black male academic achievement constituted the grounds for concluding that the
academies violated the Equal Protection Clause, the school board's apparent lack of concern
for the problems facing black girls also raised Title IX issues. If the school board had
thought to provide the same intensive Afrocentric instruction and mentoring for girls, the
"different aid, benefits, and services" problem would not have loomed so large. See id. at
1007-08.
219. See id. at 1009. The district court also considered the legal status of the male academies under the Equal Educational Opportunities Act, 20 USC § 1701 et seq. (1990), but
distinguished the only applicable EEOA case, United States v. Hinds County Sch. Bd., 560
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emption to Title IX for grades K through 12 applies only to established
programs and not to new ones.22 ° Second, because the boys benefited from
special classes and mentoring not available in Detroit's coed facilities, the
academies failed to protect the girls' statutory right to the same benefits
and services as males.22 1 Finally, the court deferred to the opinion of the
U.S. Office of Civil Rights with regard to the academies' remedial purpose.22 2 The school board alleged that "conditions have resulted in limited
participation of urban males in educational programs and activities" and
that, even absent a finding of discrimination, the all-male academies served
an affirmative action goal. 223 Nonetheless, the OCR's opinion that "all
male public elementary and secondary school programs violate Title IX"
showed the plaintiffs' likelihood of success on the merits.2 24
The district court did not engage in a "separate but equal" analysis in
Garretbecause Detroit offered "no schools for girls even comparable to the
Male Academies." 2" However, in its discussion of Title IX, the court
seemed more concerned with the girls' statutory right to the same benefits
and services as boys than with the proscription of single-sex admissions
22 6
policies.
B.

Affirmative Action and Remedial Purpose under Title IX

Although the Garrett court largely ignored the remedial purpose that
the Detroit School Board articulated, Title IX's implementing regulations
do authorize affirmative action programs in some circumstances. 227 Because classes addressing girls' educational disadvantages harmonize with
Congressional concern about the invidious effects of sex discrimination on
women,22 8 they satisfy Title IX more readily than do the black male
academies.
F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1977), on the grounds that while Title IX proscribes involuntary, perma-

nent school assignments based on sex, it does not proscribe voluntary, experimental programs. See id. at 1010. Hinds does not control the legality of single-sex math and science
classes for the same reason. See id.
220. See id. at 1009.
221. See id.
222. See id. at 1009-10 (noting that the Michigan State Department of Education had
notified the defendant that the male academies violated Title IX).
223. Id. at 1009 (summarizing the defendant's argument and quoting language from the
Title IX implementing regulations, 24 C.F.R. § 106.3 (1997)).
224. See id. at 1009-10.
225. See id. at 1006.
226. See id. at 1009 (noting that the plaintiffs' claims did not rest solely upon their exclusion from the boys' academies, but also on the fact that special features of the boys' curriculum were unavailable at coed schools).
227. See infra note 247 and accompanying text.
228. See infra notes 229-34 and accompanying text.
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Senator Bayh introduced the Senate version of Title IX in 1972 by
declaring that "[o]ne of the great failings of the American educational system is the continuation of corrosive and unjustified discrimination against
women."2 29 The problem he identified can be generalized as a denial of
access: Sexist admissions policies kept women out of prestigious colleges
and graduate programs, as did the inequitable distribution of scholarship
money. 230 Not surprisingly, Bayh's speech did not contain a word about
men being kept out of anything.
It is in light of Congress' dominant concern with the exclusion of
women from lucrative career tracks that Title IX's limitations on single-sex
education must be viewed. In the sphere of vocational education, for example, Bayh noted:
The discriminatory effect of sex segregation in vocational education is that many fields which are designated for females such as
cosmetology or food handling are less technical and therefore
less lucrative than fields such as TV repair and auto mechanics
"reserved" for males. And yet it is only tradition which keeps
women out of these fields.23 '
Bayh noted similar imbalances in higher education, particularly in the
advanced sciences. For example, in 1970, women constituted only 29.3
percent of the freshman class in the nation's thirty-five most selective colleges, 232 thirty-one percent of first-year enrollees in biochemistry, 233 and
ten percent or less of the students at seventy-one medical schools across the
country.23 4
Although the speeches on the Senate floor in 1972 voiced concern
about the underrepresentation of women in certain areas of academia, including math and science, the plain language of the statute does not lend
itself to an anti-subordination reading. Statutory provisions stating that no
person shall be denied benefits on the basis of sex necessarily circumscribe
229. 118 CONG. Rac. 5803 (Feb. 28, 1972) (speech by Senator Bayh).
230. See, e.g., id. at 5805 (noting that financial aid awards to men were, on average, $215
higher); see also id. at 5806 (citing testimony that "at lower levels of ability, applications
from men are markedly preferred over identical applications from women"); id. at 5808
(reporting that, according to a study done in 1971, 40 percent of boys with high school
grades of C or lower gained admission to college, while only 20 percent of girls with the
same grades were accepted); id. at 5809 (stating that fewer women were accepted to graduate school than men, even though undergraduate grade point averages for women were
significantly higher).
231.

See id. at 5806.

232. See id. at 5809.
233. See id. at 5805.

234. See id. at 5806.
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remedies for group-based discrimination.2 35 Moreover, the legislative history demonstrates that Congress rejected quotas in favor of "equality of
opportunity,"23' 6 and that Bayh himself distinguished "overt discrimination," which the Senate Bill targeted, from societal "sex-role expectations,"
toward which Congress exhibited greater ambivalence. 3 7 The floor discussion nevertheless focused on statistics, and, in doing so, sowed the
seeds of discord over what should be done if anti-differentiation failed to
eradicate gender disparities.
The potential tension between the anti-subordination and anti-differentiation strands in the statutory scheme did not seem so troubling when
the Education Act Amendments were passed because, in 1972, gender distinctions favored the dominant sex. Even the debate over mandatory coeducation often included the assumption that single-sex schools discriminated
against women, either by refusing to admit them2 38 or by channeling them
into stereotypical, low-paid jobs.23 9
While Congress may have intended to allow experimentation by enacting a hodgepodge of exemptions, the incoherence of Title IX with regard to single-sex education gives the courts little guidance. The
exemptions for public universities with traditionally single-sex admissions
policies seem to have arisen from constituency politics. Defending Texas
Woman's University, a public institution in their home state, Senators
Bentsen and Tower expressly rejected the idea that the existence of such
schools posed a civil rights concern.24 ° Bentsen contended:
The women attending [Texas Woman's University] do so voluntarily because they wish to have the experience of attending an
all-female institution. If they did not want to attend, they could
go to North Texas State or another institution of higher education
in Texas. Is this really a civil rights issue? I do not think in this
instance it is. [Texas Woman's University] has a cohesiveness
that other institutions do not have. It is a unique and distinctive
institution, and it should be allowed to exist.24 '
235. See Title IX of the Education Act Amendments of 1972,20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1994)
("No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation
in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program
or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.").
236. See 118 CONG. REc. at 5812.
237. See id. at 5805.
238. See, e.g., id. at 5807 (discussing the need to encourage all-male schools that had
recently begun to admit women).
239. See, e.g., id. at 5806 (discussing single-sex vocational schools).
240. See id. at 5814 (recording a speech by Senator Bentsen).
241. Id. Senator Tower's support of the women's school arose from more personal than
political sentiments. He reported that his wife "graduated from Texas Woman's University
and received a very fine education from A to Z there." Id. (speech by Senator Tower).
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Significantly, Bentsen did not see a contradiction between Title IX's
guarantees of educational equality and his emphasis on the "uniqueness" of
Texas Woman's University.24 With regard to the number and effectiveness of single-sex elementary and secondary facilities, Senator Bayh admitted that the Senate possessed no statistics and recommended postponing a
Congressional decision until research on the issue was more complete.2 43
However, unlike Bentsen and Tower, Bayh predicted that the data would
ultimately disfavor single-sex admissions. 2'
Tensions between anti-differentiation and anti-subordination afflict
Title IX's implementing regulations as well. The regulations raise a barrier
to gender-segregated math and science classes by prohibiting gender distinctions in course offerings, with the exception of vocal choruses, sex education, and contact sports like wrestling, and forbidding the provision of
"different aid, benefits or services" based on sex.2 45 Even if boys and girls
both enjoy a single-gender option, the regulations declare that a federally2 46
funded school may not "[p]rovide services in a different manner.
Hence, a teacher who varies her instructional style between an all-female
and an all-male class may do so illegally.
An intent to remedy gender imbalances arguably overcomes these
problems. The Secretary of Education has established regulations providing that federal aid recipients shall take remedial action if they have "discriminated against persons on the basis of sex" and that recipients may
implement affirmative action programs "to overcome the effects of conditions that resulted in limited participation ... by persons of a particular
sex."' 247 The Detroit School Board relied unsuccessfully on this disparate
impact language,24 and, while the Garrett court declined to discuss affirmative action under Title IX, it is not difficult to see why the black male
academies did not prevail on such a theory. Aside from the conclusions of
242. See id.
243. See id. at 5807. Senator Bayh stated:
I have been amazed to learn that the Office of Education does not even keep
statistics on how many elementary and secondary schools-even public schools
-are restricted in admissions to one sex. After these questions have been properly addressed, then Congress can make a fully informed decision on the question
of which-if any-schools should be exempted.
Id. But see Rhode, supra note 11, at 136-37 ("From the substantial amount of academic
research on the subject [of single-sex education], the legislators' professed ignorance
seemed largely self-imposed.").
244. See 118 CONG. REc. at 5807 (quoting Senator Bayh) ("My view is that many of
these exemptions will not be supportable after further study and discussion.").
245. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.31(b)(2) (1998).
246. See id.

247. See id. at § 106.3(a)-(b).
248. See Garrett v. Board of Educ., 775 F. Supp. 1004, 1009-10 (E.D. Mich. 1991).
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a few educators that white female teachers misinterpret the behavior of
African-American males, dismissing them as hoodlums or persons with
learning disabilities,24 9 there is little concrete data showing that black
males receive less or different attention from the school system than their
female counterparts. Their slightly higher dropout rates constitute the only
evidence that their participation in academic activity has been more "limited" than that of black girls, almost half of whom never wear a cap and
gown. - 0
In contrast, research on the treatment of female students establishes
that, across the country, educators have violated the dictates of the implementing regulations by instructing girls in a "different manner" than boys
in coeducational settings 25 ' and by discriminating against girls in counseling and guidance.2" 2 Even if the Secretary of Education does not find discrimination by individual schools, the low numbers of women in advanced
math and science classes by the twelfth grade and the silence of those who
do enroll constitutes "limited participation" within the meaning of the affirmative action provision.2 53
Analysis of Title IX in the context of the recent retreat from single-sex
pilot programs highlights the need for statutory flexibility to accommodate
experimentation but counsels against embracing an anti-subordination principle that ignores a web of factors producing disadvantage. The role of
socioeconomic status, which the AAUW calls the single most accurate predictor of educational outcomes, demands further research.25 4 In the case of
the black male academies, the gender imbalance is dwarfed by larger disparities between African-American urban communities and the rest of society. Creating the false sense that only the boys in the inner city "need a
vision and a plan for living" will do little to solve the problem.255 Yet,
249. See, e.g., JANICE E. HALE-BENSON, BLACK CuILDREN: THEIR ROOTS, CULTURE,
AND LEARNiNG STYLms 1-2 (rev. ed. 1986) (asserting that the failure of the present system is
shown by the disproportionate number of black children who are either labeled hyperactive
and given tranquilizing drugs or labeled mentally retarded and placed in special education
classes.)
250. See supra note 216 and accompanying text.

251. See id. at § 106.31(b)(2).
252. See id. at § 106.3(a)-(b) ("A recipient shall not discriminate against any person on
the basis of sex in the counseling or guidance of students or applicants for admission.").
253. See id.
254. See How SCHOOLS SHORTCHANGE GmLs, supra note 31, at 34. The AAUW reports
that girls of low socioeconomic status do better than boys of similar status, regardless of
race, and that, by eighth grade, very few children of low socioeconomic status score at
advanced levels of reading or math. Reciprocally, very few affluent boys and girls score
below basic levels. See id.
255. See Garrett v. Board of Educ., 775 F. Supp. 1994, 1004, 1007 (E.D. Mich. 1991).
(criticizing the Rites of Passage curriculum of the black male academies). The court be-
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where gender dynamics do seem to explain inequality, the single-sex option merits exploration. Educators cannot assess the benefits of all-female
learning if they are not allowed to experiment.
With all its ambiguities, Title IX might be interpreted to preclude experimentation with gender separation in math and science. The impediments that the statute and its implementing regulations create to segregated
classes in coed schools, but not to single-sex admissions in grades K
through 12, lacks a valid theoretical underpinning. Thus, although caution
is imperative, legislators ought to amend the statute to clarify the legality
of voluntary single-sex classes in subjects in which girls' participation has
been discouraged.
IV.

Single-sex Math and Science: Short-Term Gain But Long-Term
Disaster?

A.

Diversity, Assimilation, and EducationalReform

Freeing the discussion for a moment from the constraints of legal doctrine illuminates the reasons that some Americans believe the state should
impose integration on subordinated groups. Those who read the integrationist mandate of Brown to forbid all separate educational facilities have
watched the creation of black academies and theme houses with horrified
bemusement.2 56 For example, Dr. Kenneth Clark, whose research on the
psychological effects of racial segregation was cited in Brown, calls the
decision to send black children to racially-exclusive institutions "academic
25 7
child abuse.
The rise of coeducation was not fraught with the violence and passion
that characterized the struggle for racial integration. Nevertheless, many
feminists see a return to single-sex schools as a betrayal of hard-won victories over sex discrimination.2 5 Appeals to the tradition behind all-female
schooling conjure memories, not only of the Seven Sisters' historic promilieved that such a program "suggests a false dichotomy between the roles and responsibilities of boys and girls." Id.
256. See, e.g., Drew S. Days, Brown Blues: Rethinking the Integrative Deal, 34 WM. &

L. REV. 53, 72 (1992) (observing that "[s]ome blacks and whites who had fought to
end segregation viewed [the establishment of black Afro-American housing on integrated
college campuses] as striking at the very heart of what Brown symbolized"). Days himself
recognizes that integration came at a high cost to blacks, who bore the brunt of busing,
teacher lay-offs, and increased discipline. See id. at 55. However, he argues that the interest in "saving black males from educational and social disaster" does not require the exclusion of whites. See id. at 61-62.
MARY

257. See, e.g., Sam Roberts, Separate Schools for Male Blacks Igniting Debate, N.Y.

TiMEs, Nov. 12, 1990, at B1 (quoting Dr. Kenneth Clark).
258. See supra notes 107-10 and accompanying text.
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nence, but also of the argument that giving women the same education as
men would divert menstrual blood to their brains. 259
The value of integration may extend beyond equality of resources,
prestige, and instruction. In University of CaliforniaRegents v. Bakke,26 °
Justice Powell accepted the petitioner's characterization of educational diversity as a compelling state interest because it contributes to the "robust
exchange of ideas."2 6 ' Exposure to the perspective of a black student
forms a vital part of a white student's education; likewise, observing a
schoolgirl competently prove a theorem affects a boy's perception of the
opposite sex. If blacks and females shun the integrated classroom, part of
this diversity will be lost, and academic conversation will be correspondingly diminished.
Nancy Denton and Douglas Massey suggest that the insularity of
black neighborhoods has created a counterculture that quite literally speaks
a different language than that of mainstream America.2 62 Sending children
from these communities to schools that are exclusively black, as a matter
of policy or geography, intensifies their social isolation and insures that
they never acquire the cultural and linguistic tools necessary for success in
the American economy.26 3 In a similar fashion, white children sheltered
from contact with other races adopt their parents' views without having
such assumptions and biases challenged in the classroom. Moreover,
resegregation conveys the unfortunate message that blacks have given up
the battle to integrate American classrooms and that tensions between the
races are irreconcilable. Hence, while all-black schools seek to instill ethnic pride in their students, they risk imparting a lesson of despair about the
prospects for racial reconciliation.
In the case of gender, however, one wonders whether a temporary
window of segregation during the adolescent years would dangerously impoverish the learning process. Some theorists believe that defacto separation already afflicts our coed institutions. David and Myra Sadker contend,
for example, that within public schools, "[tihere are two separate, alien,
unequal nations ...walled off by gender but left undisturbed," and that this
unofficial segregation manifests itself in separate cafeteria tables, sex-spe-

259. See SADKER & SADKER, FA _iNG AT FAuRNEss, supra note 8, at 231 (discussing the
ideas of Dr. Edward Clarke, author of SEx AND EDUCATION (1873)).
260. 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (Powell, J., plurality opinion).
261. See id. at 312-13.
262. See DouGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS

263. See id. at 141.

163 (1993).
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cific playground games, and unequal classroom interaction.2 6" According
to the Sadkers, educators must strive against these gender boundaries, not
reinforce them.2 65 David Sadker criticizes single-sex math and science
programs on the grounds that it is "'a plan that misses two boats: ... the
education of boys, and the reality that children need to learn how to cope in
a coed world." '6 6 However, several researchers, including Sadker, have
expressed the view that single-sex classes represent a laboratory where
teachers can acquire insights for later use in the coeducational setting.2 67
The desirability of such a short-term approach stems from the concern that,
although limited separation may do adolescents some good, prolonged isolation from the opposite sex could spell disaster.268
Even if girls benefit from the increased attention they receive in single-sex classes, depriving male students of the ability to witness female
intellectual competence impoverishes them culturally and may reinforce
264. See SADKER & SADrER, FAILING AT FAuN'Ess, supra note 8, at 58-59. Defenders of
black separatism notice a similar problem with regard to race. Kevin Brown writes, for
example:
[R]acial Realists [his term for black separatists] ... are not so much choosing
racial separation as they are recognizing the realities of racial separation in
America's public schools. Despite the desires, aspirations, intentions, and efforts
of millions of Americans, the forty-year effort to integrate America's public
schools has failed to accomplish its objective. New reports indicate that racial
separation of our public schools in 1990 was about the same as it was in 1972.
Kevin Brown, Essay, A Reply to Cummings: Are the Racial Realists Forced to Embrace
the Legal Rationale of the Liberal and IntegrationistStructures?, 20 HASnNGS CONST. L.
Q. 783, 785-76 (1993). The critical difference between Sadker and Brown lies in their
solution to the problem of separate realities. For Brown, defacto racial segregation in the
public school system justifies the creation of all-black schools. See id. at 786-87. For
Sadker, by contrast, gender separation is to be resisted, not embraced. See infra notes 26566 and accompanying text. Brown and Sadker ultimately are at odds because the "Racial
Realist" agenda has led to efforts to create all-male schools attended overwhelmingly by
blacks. While Brown asserts that "Racial Realists are concerned not about gender but about
race," he admits that "even in areas where the students are predominantly black, separate
schools for males without concomitant and equal facilities for females is likely to violate the
Equal Protection Clause due to gender-based discrimination." Id. at 784-85. Brown's program threatens to negatively affect black girls. See Richard Cummings, All-Male Black
Schools: Equal Protection, the New Separatismand Brown v. Board of Education, 20 HAS.
TINGS CONST. L. Q. 725, 736-41 (arguing that predominantly black all-male academies confer unequal benefits on black girls and that the teaching of Afrocentrism idealizes African
cultures in which women have experienced political oppression).
265. See, e.g. David Sadker & Jacqueline Sadker, Separate-But Still Short-Changed,
WASH. PosT, Nov. 1, 1995, at A19; Gross, supra note 48, at 5C.
266. See Hancock & Kalb, supra note 10, at 76 (quoting David Sadker).
267. See, e.g., Sadker & Sadker, Separate-But Still Short-Changed,supra note 265, at
A19; Gross, supra note 48, at 5C (discussing the view of AAUW Report author, Susan
Bailey).
268. See Sadker & Sadker, Separate-But Still Short-Changed,supra note 265, at A19.
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their perception of girls as a sexual commodity.26 9 Moreover, too few theorists have considered the role that women have played in policing harmful
gender norms. The obsession with beauty, for example, may owe almost
as much to values handed down from mother to daughter and enforced
horizontally by same-gender peer groups as to pressure from men. It is
naive to think that giving girls their own classroom constitutes an instant
antidote to the male-referential values that girls imbibe.
I do not believe, however, that the risks of attending single-sex education are as grave as those posed by racial resegregation. It would be rare
for a child to mature in total isolation from the opposite sex. One can
invent hypotheticals that parallel the extreme insularity of some ethnic
neighborhoods: A girl raised by a single mother who has cut ties to her
relatives might lack male authority figures and playmates. However, as a
general rule, children experience cross-gender socialization at home and in
after-school activities. Their world will be coeducational, even though
their school is not. Moreover, if we accept the argument that single-sex
education encourages females to express their ideas,270 voluntary gender
segregation may have the effect of allowing women to participate more
fully in the cultural conversation.
Assimilation-the melting pot, instead of the salad-has an inverse
relationship to diversity. It is under the rubric of "assimilation" that
Denton and Massey's concern about Black English fits. In their view, integration represents a necessary avenue for African-Americans to shed their
countercultural distaste for education and family responsibility and learn to
speak the idiom that most employers require. 27 ' Testing the accuracy of
their vision of a pathological inner-city world lies beyond the scope of this
article. However, it is worth asking whether the concept of assimilation
has relevance to single-sex education.
Gary Peller contends that "everyday public school culture in inte'
grated schools . . .[is] essentially a white culture."272
It is also a male
culture with male-defined tests and standards of achievement. 3 Champi269. See id. ("Boys don't need their own school to become the center of attention; they
are already the center of attention in the coed classroom. Sometimes, all-boys' schools
actually fan the flames of sexism, making a bad problem worse.").
270. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
271. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 262, at 164-65.
272. See Peller, supra note 100, at 845-46.
273. The AAUW reports that textbook publishers have gradually begun to adopt rules
relating to the inclusion of women in history and literature books. Yet, as late as 1990, texts
designed to comply with California state guidelines still showed "subtle language bias, neglect of scholarship on women, omission of women as developers of history and initiators
of events, and absence of women from accounts of technological developments." How
ScHooLs SHORTCHANGE GIRS, supra note 31, at 63. Although I accept that the omission
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ons of female "difference" believe that women speak in a unique voice that
gets suppressed when they are forced to adopt masculine thought

processes. 74 Although girls may learn better in a relaxed and cooperative
setting, 275' the presence of boys in classroom learning groups relegates less
assertive females to the status of followers.2 7 6
On the other hand, placing girls in a separate educational setting that
emphasizes collaboration at the expense of speed, aggression, and decisiveness may prepare them poorly for the traits that employers reward. In the
case of math and science classes, we need to ask whether quick, independent thinking constitutes an integral part of the exercise. Elizabeth Fennema

notes, for example, that girls who attain high levels of math achievement
often cite "teachers being 'sex-blind"' as their primary positive influence.2 7 7 Aside from the legal necessity of satisfying the "exceedingly persuasive justification" test,27 8 educators have practical reasons to scrutinize
the content of single-sex classroom instruction.

The debate over Afrocentrism offers a useful parallel. Concerned that
white educational culture presents African-Americans as the object but
of women from academic materials has a negative influence on women's self-esteem, I
believe that the solution to the problem is more complex than just including several chapters
on female inventors and authors. I dissent from the idea that we simply should present
anomalous high-achieving, public women from a time period in which most females stayed
home, raising children or doing farm labor, depending on their social status. I do not think
it is helpful in the long run to show the "silver lining" of women's achievement without
showing the less palatable reality. See my discussion of Afrocentrism infra notes 279-83
and accompanying text.
The AAUW also documents the alleged existence of gender bias in standardized testing. Here, the evidence of a linkage between the exclusion of culturally "female" questions
and the performance of female test takers is somewhat tenuous. Test questions in verbal
and mathematical sections of the PSAT and SAT refer more often to masculine subjects and
male characters. See How SCHOOLS SHORTCHANGE GIRLS, supra note 31, at 53-57. The
AAUW reports that this imbalance "has no demonstrable effect at all on examinee performance" on math word problems. See id. But see SADKER & SADIER, FAILING AT FAIRNESS,
supra note 8, at 153 (claiming that boys and girls perform better on questions relating to
their gender and that this has a disproportionately negative impact on girls because there are
few feminine questions). The Sadkers observed: "[A] recent group of SAT reading comprehension questions mentioned forty-two men but only three women. One... was anthropologist Margaret Mead, whose research was criticized throughout the passage." Id.
274. See generally, e.g., CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIF'E rr VOICE (1982) (presenting her
findings about the different linguistic patterns men and women use to describe their disparate experiences of social reality).
275. See How SCHOOLS SHORTCHANGE Gnus, supra note 31, at 72 (citing BELENKY ET
AL., WomEN's WAYS OF KNOWING: Tim DEVELOPmENT OF SELF, BODY, AND MIND (1986)).
276. See id. at 72-73 (noting that, in a recent study of elementary school children, the
highest achievers displayed the fewest cooperative attitudes and that group activities in a
coed setting tend to provide boys, but not less assertive girls, with leadership opportunities).
277. See Fennema, supra note 19, at 174.
278. See United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2286 (1996).

1998]

Subtracting Sexism from the Classroom

never the subject of history and literature, black educators have developed
a curriculum that "teaches basic courses by using Africa and the sociohistorical experience of Africans and African-Americans as its reference
points." 7 9 The goal, according to one scholar, is "to show African-American students that they can maintain their cultural identity and still succeed
in their studies."2 8 0 However, instead of giving the subordinated group a
source of cultural pride grounded in documented historical events,
Afrocentrism may invent a fictional past. Critics contend, for example,
that the use of ancient Egypt as a focal point of black culture ignores evidence that "Egypt is a Middle Eastern, not an African, culture." '8 1 Others
worry that teaching melanism fosters the reverse racist notion that darkerskinned people possess superior intelligence.28 2 The debate Afrocentrism
has spawned underscores the risk embodied in any type of special education: not that it stigmatizes a subordinated group by segregating them (for
Afrocentric schools are nominally open to "anyone who wishes to attend
on a racially-neutral basis"),2 83 but that it subjects them to questionable
pedagogy. Just as shoddy theories cannot compensate for textbooks that
mentioned African-Americans only in the context of the slave trade, public
schools will do girls a grave disservice if they fail to teach them real math.
One of the most compelling arguments against single-sex math and
science focuses on the external nature of the harm: the neglect, belittling,
and harassment of girls by educators and male students.2 84 If boys' behavior represents a greater problem than the sexist attitudes of teachers and
counselors, separating students on the basis of sex may be the most expedient solution. If adults' discouraging influence on the career aspirations of
girls constitutes the pith of the matter, however, single-sex classes may
have no salutary effect at all. In any case, a hasty resort to gender segrega279. Brown, supra note 94, at 852.

280. Id.
281. DRn4SH D'SouzA, ILLIBERAL EDUCATION 115 (1991) (discussing the rejection of the
Afrocentric view of Egypt by classicist Frank Snowden).
282. See Steven Siegel, Ethnocentric Public School Curriculum in a Multicultural Nation: ProposedStandardsfor JudicialReview, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 311, 319-20 (1996)
(opining that "[m]ost Afrocentric scholarship is not false, misleading, or racist" but that the
melanin theory exemplifies a "radical Afrocentric curriculum.., motivated by rhetorical or
ideological purposes"); see also Tamara Henry, Afrocentric Curriculumon Trial: Teaching Self-Esteem or Racism? Milwaukee School Board Decides, USA TODAY, Dec. 18,
1996, at 6D (noting that Leon Todd, a black member of the Milwaukee School Board,
"complains that Afrocentric teachings distort history by attributing supernatural powers to
blacks"). But see Brown, supra note 94, at 853 ("An Afrocentric perspective does not
glorify everything blacks have done.").
283. Brown, supra note 94, at 858.
284. See supra notes 35-40, 43-45 and accompanying text.
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tion begs the question of why girls should choose between bad coeducation
and an all-female option. Perhaps we should fix the coed schools instead.
The 1992 AAUW Report advises educators to videotape classes to
alert teachers to the sexist practices in which they unconsciously engage.2 8
Such an approach finds support in Fennema and Patterson's observation
that, while math instructors can recognize one trouble-spot, they often refuse to acknowledge a pattern of differential treatment,2 8 6 relying instead
on generalizations about the inherited tendencies of the sexes. If teachers
became aware that they respond to the boys who shout the loudest, instead
of balancing classroom interaction, they might achieve something close to
gender equity. Moreover, some of the cooperative techniques pioneered in
all-female classes-hands-on learning, as opposed to rote memorization of
lecture material, for example-might have beneficial effects on the academic performance of girls and boys.
B.

Conclusion

In Part II of this essay, I suggested that, instead of making classes like
Math-PLUS nominally gender-neutral, school boards should argue that the
Constitution guarantees equality of opportunity, but not integration. If
girls choose an all-female option, concerns about stigmatic role-typing lose
much of their force. Moreover, because single-sex math and science programs derive from legitimate empirical research about girls' problems with
self-esteem and academic performance in coed settings, they should satisfy
the "substantial relationship" test.
The discussion of Title IX in Part II criticized Congress for enacting
legislation that protects some single-sex activities, but not others, without a
theoretical basis for doing so. A legislative clarification of a statute that
controls educational purse strings, regardless of actual injury, is much
needed and long overdue. However, my conclusion that there is no principled legal basis for forbidding voluntary gender separation does not
amount to an endorsement of its practicality or desirability. Indeed, one of
the chief problems with the anti-subordination argument is its tendency to
encourage the use of benign classifications where gender-neutral approaches would be more advisable.
Single-sex education arguably poses fewer societal dangers than voluntary racial re-segregation. Yet, despite the relatively benign effects of
single-sex classes compared to single-race schools, critics of the math and
science pilot programs make a strong case for reforming, rather than dismantling, coeducation. Indeed, if teachers can alter classroom culture
285. See How SCHOOLS SHORTCHANGE GIRLS, supra note 31, at 74.
286. See Fennema & Patterson, supra note 19, at 30-31.
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without separating boys and girls, they can combat female underachievement without sacrificing the lessons in tolerance that diversity teaches.

